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ABSTRACT 
This thesis uses a comparative case study approach to examine how security 
cultures change under the impact of political shocks and learning through failure. The 
thesis thus analyzes the security cultures of Germany and the United States as they evolve 
under the impact of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina from 1992 to 1995. The thesis 
thereby also enhances our understanding of German and U.S. foreign policies. Using 
paired observations for controlled comparison, the thesis employs process tracing to 
examine the nature and quantity of change. The case studies demonstrate that security 
cultures influence the assessment of political situations, restrain policy objectives, and 
condition the range of issues to which political attention is devoted. Both cases reveal 
that security cultures affect the evaluation of policy options and the choices that are 
made. The thesis argues that different transformations of German and U.S. security 
cultures led to divergent political behavior particularly with regard to the use of force, 
resulting in more forceful and effective interventions in Bosnia and a reframing of future 
interventions in third-party conflicts. Domestic reactions to the Bosnian war transformed 
the security culture in Germany, whereas reactions in the U.S. triggered a re-ranking of 
cultural preferences. Understanding how security cultures change and evolve through 
exogenous and endogenous factors improves the chances of policy success in today's 
challenging international environment.  
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World politics have undergone an unanticipated and unprecedented diplomatic 
and strategic revolution since 1989, the year that ushered in a new era of rapid change. 
New political actors appeared within and on the horizon of Europe. Security issues that 
had dominated policy for over forty years suddenly disappeared. Theories of International 
Relations were challenged to explain and interpret breathtaking and puzzling new events. 
Realist and neo-liberalist assumptions of rational, unitary actors with interests 
predetermined by the balance of power were challenged by constructivist and culturalist 
approaches focused on the social construction of actors' identities and interests. Some of 
the puzzles for realists and neo-liberals could be explained by those theories.  
Exploring the political culture of international actors helps to clarify diverging 
policies and increases the chance of success in politics, while decreasing the risks of 
misperception, miscommunication and flawed policies. Culture helps orient people to the 
political environment. It shapes and constrains the behavior and interests of political 
actors. The post-Cold War era thus requires rethinking and reorienting international 
relations. This is particularly relevant to the increasingly shared security culture among 
actors in the transitional process. The basic insight is this: culture matters in world 
politics. 
This thesis illustrates how Euro-Atlantic security cultures have adjusted to the 
post-Cold War environment. The thesis explores the security culture of Germany and the 
United States during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, beginning in 1992 and ending with 
the Dayton Peace Accords of 1995. Examining the Bosnian war and its effect on the 
German and the American security culture provides a better understanding of the causal 
impact of crises and political shocks on international actors, their subsequent internal 
change, and the implications of changing security culture on the preferences and behavior 
of international actors. The findings of this thesis might provide scholars and 
policymakers with novel insights on the evolution of security cultures and the 
ramifications of this process for international relations. 
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In recent years, security cultures, often called strategic cultures, have become the 
focus of serious research efforts by scholars of war and peace. There is wide-ranging 
theoretical and empirical disagreement among such scholars on pivotal issues. A major 
disagreement concerns the dynamic understanding of cultures. Earlier research, assuming 
coherent and stable cultural entities, held that security culture is resistant to change. More 
recent research highlights the dynamic nature of security cultures, linking culture and 
behavior, as one scholar writes, “by considering culture as practice.”1 The literature 
argues that security cultures evolve, sometimes slowly and incrementally, other times 
rapidly in the wake of a defining event. This thesis follows those scholars who emphasize 
the dynamics of security cultures, analyzing their emergence and transformation, their 
path-dependence and boundaries.  
It is of both academic interest and political importance to reveal the causal 
mechanisms linking security culture and political behavior. The case studies of Germany 
and the United States demonstrate that security cultures influence the assessment of 
political situations, restrain policy objectives, and condition the range of issues to which 
political attention is devoted. Both case studies reveal that a changing security culture 
affects the evaluation of available policy options and the choices that are made. Security 
culture thus predisposes the behavior of key actors and institutions.  
The German case study suggests that the option to use military force during the 
first years of the Bosnian war was simply rejected by leading elites as inappropriate, even 
taboo. The prevailing security culture in Germany derived from the experience of World 
War II and Federal Republic of Germany's (FRG) political culture in the Cold War. The 
horrendous war atrocities in Bosnia after 1992 triggered a substantial change in German 
views on the use of force among both political elites and society as a whole. For the 
United States, on the other hand, the option of forceful and effective intervention in 
European affairs was at the outset simply not imagined by the George H. W. Bush 
administration, which adhered to the political status quo of an intact Yugoslavia and had 
strategic concerns about the dissolving Soviet Union and the Persian Gulf. The policy 
                                                 
1 Darryl Howlett, “Strategic Culture: Reviewing Recent Literature,” Strategic Insights 4, no.10 (2005), 
7, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/howlettOct05.asp, accessed 30 August 2006. 
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changed with the presidency of Bill Clinton. The case study examines whether the 
Bosnian war affected the U.S. security culture itself, or only shifted policies towards 
more effective intervention. 
Broad scholarly research on the German security culture emerged after 
unification, but little research is available on the security culture of the United States in 
regard to the wars in former Yugoslavia. 
Given that security cultures condition political action and influence and frame 
policy options, this thesis aims specifically to enhance our understanding of German and 
U.S. foreign policies. The thesis analyzes the political motivations and choices of the two 
states during the war, arguing that the transformation of their respective security cultures 
led to diverging political behavior. The domestic feedback of the Bosnian war 
transformed German security culture and to a lesser extend the American, particularly 
with regard to the use of force. This resulted in more forceful and effective interventions 
in Bosnia and has framed the future of both countries' interventions in conflicts. 
Understanding how security cultures change and evolve through exogenous and 
endogenous factors increases the chances of policy success, so this thesis might improve 
policy in today's challenging international environment. 
To address how the war in Bosnia changed German and American security 
cultures, the thesis treats the Bosnian war as an enduring political shock experience with 
far-ranging repercussions on German and U.S. society and political elites, considering 
how the war reoriented both security cultures and changed policy choices. The thesis 
focuses on two components of security cultures, the shared perception of the use of force 
and multilateralism. It argues that within a few years, German perception of military 
force changed considerably to favor effective and legitimate deployment of German 
forces beyond national territory and treaty obligations. The thesis demonstrates that the 
security culture of the United States also shifted as a result of the international 
environment, from abstention in the early 1990s to a more effective and intensive 
intervention in European affairs. All in all, the thesis aims to shed light on how security 
cultures change due to external shocks. 
 4
This thesis tests how national security cultures impact the political preferences 
and choices of international actors. The dependent variables (DV) are changes in U.S. 
and German security cultures; the independent variable (IV) is the Bosnian war. 
Intervening variables (Int V) are factors that mediate between the Bosnian war and 
domestic security culture, i.e. which cause the war to have an impact on societal and elite 
predispositions. These factors center on crises and formative events.2 The thesis assumes 
that only those international events perceived as very profound and challenging can 
change national security cultures.3 To have an impact, the Bosnian war had to be 
collectively perceived as a crisis by the publics and elites in the U.S. and Germany. Major 
intervening variables which exposed the public and the leadership to the war include 
personal contacts with the war zone through visits or the testimony of refugees, as well as 
exposure to the war through the mass media and the so-called “CNN effect.”4 The change 
of security cultures is assumed to have caused a transformation of interests, norms and 
behavior.  
Chapter II of the thesis examines the concept of security cultures, focusing on the 
process of change. After presenting the general concept and the problem of heterogeneity, 
it discusses how, and how much, security cultures change. Chapter III tracks the internal 
developments and events in Bosnia in between 1992 and 1995 to establish the factual 
background.  
Subsequent chapters concentrate on the impact of these events on the security 
cultures of Germany (Chapter IV) and the United States (Chapter V), looking at both 
                                                 
2 In this thesis, crises and formative events are defined differently. The entire Bosnian war is 
conceptualized as a crisis from the U.S. and German perspective.  The war unfolded as a sequence of 
formative events understood as single incidents with singular, but interrelated impacts (e.g. Srebrenica). 
3 Cognitive consistency theory assumes that individuals make sense of the world by relying on key 
beliefs and strive to maintain consistency between their beliefs. Individuals maintain coherent belief 
systems and avoid exposure to information that is inconsistent or incompatible with their beliefs. Thus, 
belief systems are resistant to most external events. However, should change occur, the abrupt and all-
encompassing nature of belief systems changes also. See Jerel A. Rosati, “A Cognitive Approach to the 
Study of Foreign Policy,” in Foreign Policy Analysis, Continuity and Change in Its Second Generation, 
edited by Laura Neack, Jeanne A. K. Hey, and Patrick J. Haney (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1995), 
52- 63.  
4 Viktor Meier, “Die politische Bedeutung der Medien in der Konfliktbewaeltigung,” in Deutsche 
Konfliktbewaeltigung auf dem Balkan. Erfahrungen und Lehren aus dem Einsatz, edited by Rafael 
Biermann (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2002), 139-150. 
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political elites and society in general. Chapter VI compares the case studies to determine 
if values are congruent or incongruent with the concept of security culture and the 
assumptions of this thesis. Chapter VII concludes this thesis with a discussion of the 
implications of the findings for the concept of security culture. The basic testing method 
consists of paired observations. For the controlled comparison, data from both cases is 
passively observed. The thesis employs process tracing to examine the nature and 
quantity of changes. The outcome of the examination is closely related to national 
dispositions. 
The two cases diverge considerably. German and American history and politics 
differ dramatically. At the beginning of the conflict, the two nations had almost 
contradictory security cultures and opinions on the use of force and crisis management. 
Germany was diplomatically proactive in 1991, during the first phase of the conflict, 
while after an initial probe the U.S. refrained from even diplomatic interference. 
However, both nations abstained from military intervention at the beginning and later 
became fully involved in peace enforcement, with pivotal roles in the peace settlement 
(Dayton) and post-conflict peace building phases (Dayton implementation). This reveals 
a convergence, not only of policies but also of cultures. 
The case studies demonstrate that exogenous factors caused by the Bosnian war 
triggered a change of elite and popular norms and beliefs. This led to more effective crisis 
management, even though at the outset of the crisis the German and American 
predispositions and perceptions of exogenous factors differed tremendously.  
Using changes in security culture as a dependent variable is a challenge for 
research. Security cultures are hard to measure and observe.5  Therefore, this thesis 
researches so-called culture-bearing units, focusing mainly on political elites and the 
general population. Security cultures are expressed, recorded and sometimes codified in 
discourse, opinion polls and political behavior. Thus, the thesis relies on the externalities 
of culture, i.e., on observable discourse and opinions rather than on culture itself. Primary  
 
                                                 
5 Theo Farrel, “Constructivist Security Studies: Portrait of a Research Program,” International Studies 
Review 4, no.1 (2002), 60. 
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sources for the elite level are speeches, memoirs, interviews and legislative hearings, 
while sources for the general society include opinion polls and domestic laws, institutions 
and regulations that reflect cultural changes. 
 
 7
II. THE CONCEPT OF SECURITY CULTURE 
There is considerable scholarly literature on security cultures.6 It emerged in the 
1970s. The first generation of scholarly work, launched by the U.S. political scientist 
Jack Snyder, applied the political culture argument to security studies in the final phases 
of the Cold War.7 Snyder argued that rhetoric by political elites reflects a distinctive 
security culture which in turn reflects the beliefs of a whole society.8 The second 
generation of security culture researchers generally used Snyder’s contributions to 
examine superpower relations and nuclear strategy. Other scholars linked national styles, 
civic culture and ways of life to Snyder’s findings.9 In the wake of the profound political 
transformation of the 1990s, cultural interpretations were rediscovered by a third 
generation of political scholars. Constructivists like Alexander Wendt pointed to the 
impact of social structures, including norms, identity, and ideas, on the behavior of states 
or international relations.10 The diversity of academic discourse is now immense, with 
disagreements about theoretical concepts, definitions and analytical approaches to the 
topic. On the other hand, the study of culture incorporates many insights from other 
disciplines, including sociology, anthropology and social psychology. 
A. DIFFERENTIATION AND DEFINITION 
To distance themselves from rationalist theories of international relations, 
constructivist and culturalist theorists merged the concepts of security and culture. Theo 
Farrel argues that actors are located in a social structure “that both constitutes those 
                                                 
6 Elizabeth L. Stone, Christopher P. Twomey, and Peter R. Lavoy, “Comparative Strategic Culture,“ 
Strategic Insights 4, no.10 (2005), 
http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/events/recent/ComparativeStrategicCultureSep05rpt.asp, accessed 30 Aug. 
2006. 
7 Jeffrey S. Lantis, “Strategic Culture From Clausewitz to Constructivism," Strategic Insights 4, no. 10 
(2005), 2, http://www.ccc.nps.navy.mil/si/2005/Oct/lantisOct05.asp, accessed 30 Aug. 2006. 
8 Jack Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, report number R-2154-
AF (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Cooperation, 1977), 8. 
9 Lantis, “Strategic Culture From Clausewitz to Constructivism," 3. 
10 Lantis, “Strategic Culture From Clausewitz to Constructivism," 3. 
 8
actors and is constituted by their interaction.”11 The basic logic behind the constructivist 
theory is that culture plays an important role in international politics. Alastair Iain 
Johnston opines that decision-makers, both cross-nationally and over time, think and act 
differently when faced with similar circumstances because strategic realities are 
perceived differently.12 The gap between situation and response is caused by the 
“subjective processing of experiences,” which explains why perception matters in politics 
and consequently in international relations.13  
The studies of political culture have an affinity with studies of ideas and beliefs, 
but are more comprehensive. Definitions of the term "political culture" may be broad or 
narrow. In the 1960s, Almond and Verba defined political culture as a “subset of beliefs 
and values of a society that relate to the political system.”14 Other scholars equate culture 
with a collective “mind set,”15 conceptualized as general dispositions of actors and 
orientations towards action.16 John S. Duffield defines political culture as “the subjective 
and often unquestioned orientations toward and assumptions about the political world 
that characterize the members of a particular society or social unit and that guide and 
inform their behavior.”17 He argues that political culture consists of three components: 
the cognitive, which includes causal beliefs; the evaluative, which includes values and 
norms; and the affective, which includes emotional attachments, patterns of identity and 
loyalty, and feelings of affinity.18 In other words, political cultures predispose societies 
and their political representatives to certain behaviors in international politics. This thesis 
uses the concept of security culture defined by Duffield. Security culture consists of 
                                                 
11 Farrel, 49-72. 
12 Alistair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 
1995), 35-55. 
13 Harry Eckstein, “A Culturalist Theory of Political Change,” American Political Science Review 82, 
no. 3 (Sept. 1998), 790. 
14 Quoted in Lantis, “Strategic Culture From Clausewitz to Constructivism," 2. 
15 Johnston, 45. 
16 Eckstein, 790. 
17 John S. Duffield, World Power Forsaken: Political Culture, International Institutions and German 
Security Policy After Unification. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998), 23. 
18 Duffield, 23. 
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cognitive, affective and evaluative predispositions which shape foreign and security 
perceptions and policies of a collective entity.19 
B. HETEROGENEITY AND SOURCES OF SECURITY CULTURES 
Security cultures are shaped through material and ideational factors.20 Howlett 
outlines four essential sources. First, geography and natural resources are key elements in 
shaping and transforming security cultures. Geographical proximity to great powers, 
along with contested and unresolved national border problems, accounts for differing 
state security perceptions.21 A second source of security culture is history and experience. 
Historical lessons learned by political elites and actors and recent experiences do have a 
striking effect on the security culture and cause path dependence. A third source refers to 
the internal political structure of a state, e.g. the type of regime. Finally, the institutional 
framework of a state significantly influences security cultures. Institutions can develop 
unique organizational cultures which spill over and shape national security cultures.  
Scholars differ on how much homogeneity is needed to speak of one culture. 
During the Cold War, scholars around the world spoke of two cultures, the American and 
the Soviet cultures.22  That surely was a simplification. Further examination shows that 
individuals have different orientations23 and learn different things from experience.24 
Thus, societies contain “multiple strategic cultures,”25 since societies encompass various 
subcultures. Heterogeneity and homogeneity exist side by side, and the facts often show a 
dominant, hegemonic culture as well as competing ones.26 Thus it is necessary to 
examine which group actually shapes the security culture of a country. 
                                                 
19 Duffield, 24. 
20 Howlett, 4. 
21 Howlett, 4. 
22 Johnston, 37. 
23 Eckstein, 792. 
24  Jack S. Levy, “Learning and Foreign Policy: Sweeping a Conceptual Minefield,” International 
Organization 48, no. 2 (Spring 1994), 300. 
25 Johnston, 38. 
26 Howlett, 10. 
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Another debate in the literature deals with the universality and boundaries of 
security cultures. The classical approach to research is individual country studies, with   
comparative studies appearing more rarely. Researchers differ on how far security 
cultures can also be perceived as transnational phenomena. If the latter is the case, then 
cultures encompass not only states but also regions and even non-state actors, such as Al 
Quaeda.27  
The cultural effect of interdependence, globalization and integration is not yet 
much a part of the academic discourse. The question remains, do states share a common 
security culture because of parallel identity formation processes? For example, do liberal 
democracies perceive themselves as an “in-group?”28 This issue is of great relevance for 
security communities and democratic peace. Transnationalism raises the question of 
where to draw the boundaries of cultures.29 Nonetheless, universality and the boundaries 
of security cultures deserve more research. 
C. CONTINUITY AND CHANGE 
The discourse about the change of cultures is controversial. Some scholars argue 
that cultures are persistent, static and even resistant to transformation.30 Others argue that 
political cultures are dynamic. While change is normally slow and incremental, it evolves 
in phases of rest, acceleration and deceleration.31 The slow incremental change of 
security cultures is caused by learning through a continuous process of internalization and 
socialization32 which is transmitted through time. This internalization of security cultures 
is decisive; it acts as a filter insofar as it conditions later learning. In other words, 
internalization creates and transforms dispositions that accumulate over time in the form 
of security cultures. Cognitive, affective, and evaluative components of learning interact 
in this process.  
                                                 
27 Lantis, “Strategic Culture From Clausewitz to Constructivism,” 9-10. 
28 Johnston, 61. 
29 Howlett, 3. 
30 Stone, Twomey and Lavoy, 8-9. 
31 Eckstein, 793. 
32 Eckstein, 802. 
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Harry Eckstein emphasizes that besides “normal" incremental change, a second 
mode of transformation might occur, triggered by great forces which "induce great 
changes in direction and velocity.”33 A similar view is presented by Duffield, confirming 
that traumatic experiences and crises discredit core beliefs and values and modify a 
security culture.34 Gary Goertz and Paul Diehl broaden the discussion about crises and 
political shocks by distinguishing between system shocks and state shocks in their 
analysis of enduring rivalries.35 Critical junctures represent defining events. They induce 
policy choices, with a path-dependent effect.36 Initial choices determine future policy 
trajectories and outcomes, since choices foreclose some options while opening others. In 
other words, formative events are rare and sudden, but have a lasting impact. 
A useful tool for exploring the change of political cultures is the concept of 
“learning through failure.” Jack S. Levy argues that people learn more from failure than 
from success. Unanticipated and unintended negative experience stimulates policy 
debates about lessons from history and motivates change. He also argues that people 
learn more from their own experience than from others'.37  This generalization has merit 
for understanding war, peace, security, and defense in Germany and the U.S. in the 
twentieth century, when strategic trauma of varying sorts loomed large.   
D. GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 
Linking culture and politics has become more popular.38 But how are culture and 
politics causally related? Duffield argues that five causal mechanisms link national 
security culture and politics: security cultures condition the range of issues to which 
political attention is devoted, influence the diagnosis of political situations, help to  
 
                                                 
33 Eckstein, 793. 
34 Duffield, 6-23. 
35 Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “The Initiation and Termination of Enduring Rivalries: The Impact 
of Political Shocks,” American Journal of Political Science 39, no. 1 (1995) 30-52. 
36 Stephen Krasner, “Approaches to the State: Alternative Conceptions and Alternative Dynamics,” 
Comparative Politics 16, no. 2 (1984), 240-244. 
37 Levy, 279-312. 
38 Lantis, "Strategic Culture From Clausewitz to Constructivism," 2. 
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determine policy objectives, shape the formulation and identification of policy options, 
and influence the evaluation of available policy options and thus the choices made. The 
overall effect is to  
predispose societies in general and political elites in particular towards 
specific actions and policies over others. Some options will simply not be 
imagined. Of those that are contemplated, some are more likely to be 
rejected as inappropriate or ineffective than others.39  
Other scholars are less sophisticated in describing the linkage of security culture 
and politics, arguing simply that security cultures frame choices, that culture limits 
behavioral choices and creates preferences or that security cultures are preconditions of 
political actions. 
Because few issues of foreign policy in recent history have evoked so much 
division, emotion, and disillusionment as the wars in former Yugoslavia, an enormous 
literature has emerged since the middle 1990s. Research focuses on the historical context, 
causes of the conflict, its internal evolution and the conflict resolution efforts of the 
international community. The failure of national actors and international organizations to 
prevent violent conflict and enforce peace is a prevalent theme. In her groundbreaking 
book Balkan Tragedy, Susan Woodward researched the impact of the Bosnian war on the 
international environment and outside actors. Woodward argues that "failure arose from a 
lack of understanding of the causes of the conflict, and the application of Cold War 
thinking and instruments that were not appropriate to the case.”40 This analysis naturally 
raises questions about how particular national security cultures contributed to the 
situation, and at what cost.  
Others, including James Gow, analyzed “the involvement of the international 
community in trying to end the war and the overall failure of those efforts.”41 Gow 
demonstrates in his book that the main failures of the international community which led 
to the savage war were the lack of political will to use force, insufficient international 
                                                 
39 Duffield, 26-27. 
40 Susan Woodward, Balkan Tragedy:  Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington D.C.: 
Brookings Institution, 1995), vii. 
41 James Gow, Triumph of the Lack of Will:  International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1997), v. 
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cohesion and misperceptions. Christopher Bennet examined the war from another 
perspective, arguing that the constitutional arrangements in Yugoslavia under Tito were 
well-designed in regard to the relations between the Yugoslav people. Those 
arrangements were the best, and possibly the only formula for national coexistence in 
multiethnic Yugoslavia after World War II. Bennet argues that “there are rational 
explanations for everything which has taken place” in the breakup of Yugoslavia.42  
Other literature focuses more generally on the Balkan region. Dunja Melcic’s 
edited volume analyzes in detail many aspects of the historical and cultural context of this 
complex conflict.43 Another line of research examines international crisis management. 
Thomas R. Mockaitis focuses on the efforts and failures of the United Nations in former 
Yugoslavia prior to 1995.44 
A major contribution to the literature on German foreign policy is Strategic 
Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since Unification by Jeffrey S. 
Lantis.45 The main argument of his chapter on the Bosnian war is that the crisis in former 
Yugoslavia served as a catalyst to change German foreign and security policy. The 
strategic dilemmas during the war accelerated the discourse about German responsibility 
in world affairs, which culminated in the use of military force. Lantis, though, does not 
take a constructivist view. Other important literature discusses international public 
opinion during the Bosnia crisis.46 Karin Johnston's “German Public Opinion and the 
Crisis in Bosnia” highlights public opinion throughout the crisis and how it influenced 
German politics. Like Lantis, she does not connect her findings to theory about culture.   
The theoretical aspects are covered in the book World Power Forsaken by Duffield.47 
                                                 
42 Christopher Bennet, Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse Causes Course and Consequences (New York: 
New York University Press, 1995), viii. 
43Dunja Melcic, Der Jugoslawienkrieg Handbuch zur Vorgeschichte und Konsequenzen (Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag, 1999), 12. 
44 Thomas R. Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict:  The Sword or the Olive Branch 
(Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999), x. 
45 Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy Since 
Unification (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002). 
46 See Karin Johnston, “German Public Opinion and the Crisis in Bosnia,” International Public 




There is huge body of literature about the security culture of the United States. 
The main literature focuses on the U.S. security culture in the nuclear age of the Cold 
War. Snyder studied the Soviet military strategy in 1977 in the context of the U.S. 
deterrence doctrine through the lens of security culture.48 The strategic studies field is 
strongly influenced by Snyder’s work. Colin S. Gray says “there are distinctive U.S. and 
Soviet national styles in nuclear strategy, [and] those styles are comprehensible on the 
basis of historical and anthropological understanding.”49 Ken Booth demonstrates the 
importance of security cultures in multiple policy areas and its implications by providing 
“[the] first extensive examination of the relationship between ethnocentrism and 
strategy.”50 But even more recent literature does not discuss the specific repercussions of 
the Bosnian war on American security culture. The constructivist approach to cultures 
and especially the concept of learning through failure are not covered at all. 
No comparative research has yet been done on the security cultures of Germany 
and the United States. Duffield’s work on the German security culture links German 
foreign policy restraints with the constructivist findings of culture.51 Lantis examines the 
evolution of the German security culture during the Kosovo War.52 Neither examines the 
specific repercussions of the Bosnian war on the German security culture. The security 
culture of the United States is normally viewed from a realist perspective. An exception 
is Colin Dueck's book Reluctant Crusaders, which examines the changing U.S. security 
culture from a realist perspective and compares it with a domestic cultural explanation, 




                                                 
48 Snyder. 
49 Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy and National Style (Lanham, MD: Hamilton Press, 1986), ix. 
50 Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holmes and Meyer Publishers, 1979), 10. 
51 Duffield. 
52 Jeffrey S. Lantis, "The Moral Imperative of Force: The Evolution of German Strategic Culture in 
Kosovo," Comparative Strategy, no. 21 (2002). 
53 Colin Dueck, Reluctant Crusaders Power, Culture, and Change in American Grand Strategy 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006), 5. 
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Another contribution is to the literature is Michael Lind's argument, in The American 
Way of Strategy, that “the purpose of the American way of strategy has always been to 
defend the American way of life.”54  
In sum, there is a large literature on the security cultures of Germany and the U.S. 
The literature on the U.S. focuses primarily on the Cold War and the nuclear age. The 
Cold War realist perspectives still dominate scholarly work since the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. The more recent literature on German security culture views the concept of 
security cultures from a constructivist perspective. 
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III. THE BOSNIAN WAR 
The Balkan wars followed the weakening of the Communist system after the Cold 
War.55  What began as an acute crisis of post communism in southern Europe became a 
threat to the peace of Europe. The conflict proved a classical example of state 
transformation from socialism and one party rule to free market democracy. The causal 
cluster for the breakup, made possible only by the end of the Cold War, could be 
described as “economic discontent expressed through ethnic and national differences due 
to the unique nature of the federated state.”56 The communist party of Yugoslavia lost its 
ideological cohesion and gave way to nationalist and separatist ideologies that first 
plagued the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croat and Slovenes in the 1920s and later, in World 
War II, became a source of genocidal fury. Strong nationalist and separatist movements 
were present in Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia-Herzegovina and to a lesser extent in 
Slovenia and Macedonia. 
The state of Yugoslavia was formally dissolved on January 15, 1992 when the 
European Community officially recognized the republics of Croatia and Slovenia as 
sovereign states. Following their example, Bosnia held an independence referendum in 
later that year and declared its independence in March 1992. Fighting broke out when the 
Yugoslav National Army (JNA), having decades earlier evolved into an instrument of 
Serb supremacy, moved into Slovenia in June 1991 to avert “secession.” Violent clashes 
followed in the Serb-inhabited areas of Croatia, specifically Krajina and Eastern 
Slavonia. Serbia wanted to keep the Yugoslav state unified under Serb leadership. 
                                                 
55 On the Bosnian war this author relied primarily on following works: Mark Almond, Europe’s 
Backyard War: The War in the Balkans (London: Mandarin Paperbacks, 1994); Christopher Bennett, 
Yugoslavia’s Bloody Collapse Causes, Course and Consequences (New York: New York University Press, 
1995); Rafael Biermann, Lehrjahre im Kosovo: Das Scheitern der internationalen Krisenprävention vor 
Kriegsausbruch (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh, 2006); Ivo H. Daalder, Getting to Dayton: The Making 
of America’s Bosnia Policy (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2000); James Gow, Triumph of 
the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the Yugoslav War (New York: Columbia University Press, 
1997); Richard C. Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998); Dunja Melcic, ed., Der 
Jugoslawien-Krieg: Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen (Opladen/Wiesbaden: 
Westdeutscher Verlag GmbH, 1999); Thomas R. Mockaitis, Peace Operations and Intrastate Conflict, The 
Sword or the Olive Branch (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1999); Laura Silber and Alan Little, Yugoslavia: 
Death of a Nation (New York:  TV Books, 1996); Susan L. Woodward, Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and 
Dissolution after the Cold War (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1995). 
56 Mockaitis, 81. 
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Whereas peace was established in Slovenia in June 1991 and in Croatia in January 1992, 
the Bosnian war escalated into a complex four year struggle that ultimately drew in the 
international community. 
The Bosnian war is among the most complicated and intense wars since World 
War II. Multiple forces were involved, including paramilitary units, secret police and 
armed civilians supported by Bosnia, Serbia and Croatia. The ethnic groups were 
supported by various third parties from outside the former Yugoslav state, like the 
southern Slav exiles. Even the United States, with its “equip and train program” became 
involved. The civilian population was afflicted by ethnic rivalries. Mass deportations, 
detention camps and organized genocides revived memories of World War II atrocities. 
The war's impact on the international community was intensified by daily media reports 
on the heartbreaking human costs.  However, involvement of Western governments was 
characterized by misperception and misunderstanding which delayed their engagement in 
the complex war until the mid-1990s. Further, despite broad agreement, the Western 
states differed on crucial issues and their strikingly different views inhibited coordination. 
The history of the Bosnian war leads naturally to questions about the essence and 
character of security culture. 
This chapter presents the important facts and figures on the Bosnian war in the 
larger context of the Balkan wars overall. The complexity and intensity of the war is 
emphasized and major formative events are highlighted with a focus on their relevance to 
Germany and the U.S. The chapter ends with a brief discussion of international crisis 
management.  
This chapter attempts to separate the inseparable in drawing a line between the 
major events of the Bosnian war and their reception in the Western community. 
Differentiating the sender and the receiver of messages is always artificial and 
misleading. Because the two are inextricably tied, the boundaries between them are fluid 
and blurred. Thus, it is not easy to disentangle the media coverage of events in Bosnia 
from the reception it received in Germany and the U.S.  However, differentiation is 
indispensable methodologically because how the events were perceived varies based on 
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what might be called receptivity. Political reactions were strongly linked to diverging 
collective perceptions, which in turn were based on divergent cultural dispositions. 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE WAR 
After 1989 the world underwent an unexpected political transformation. The 
bipolarity of the Cold War era vanished. International parameters that had guided policy 
for over forty years suddenly disappeared. New political actors appeared on the horizon 
of Europe. Interstate tensions that marked the Cold War era gave way to new, more 
complex intra-state crises and conflicts. These internal conflicts involve three main 
structural factors: weak states, intra-state security concerns and ethnic geography.57 
Another factor is the problem of “bad neighborhoods” that make weak states more 
vulnerable to the decisions and whims of their neighbors.58  Small-scale conflicts can 
have significant spillover effects and involve whole regions, as illustrated by the wars in 
southeastern Europe in the late 1800's as well as the Balkan wars in the early 1900's.  As 
in Bosnia, ethnic conflicts may involve a complex mix of cultural, ethnic, religious, 
regional and nationalistic causes. Nationalism in particular is a root cause of the Bosnian 
war.59 The Bosnian war is a stark contrast to events elsewhere in Europe, like the 
peaceful division of Czechoslovakia in 1993. After 1989, most of Western Europe looked 




                                                 
57 Many weak states were carved out of former empires or created out of state constructs, such as 
Yugoslavia. They lacked political legitimacy, politically sensible borders, and political institutions capable 
of exercising meaningful control over the territory. Intra-state security concerns increase in those weak 
states when individual groups feel compelled to provide for their own safety. States with ethnic minorities 
are more prone to conflicts. See Michael E. Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An Overview,” in 
Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, edited by Michael E. Brown et al. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 5-
7. 
58 Discrete and deliberate government decisions often trigger conflicts in neighboring states for 
political, economic, or ideological reasons their own; see Brown, “The Causes of Internal Conflict: An 
Overview,” 16. 
59 Stephen Van Evera identifies twenty-one hypotheses on nationalism and war; see Stephen van 
Evera, “Hypothesis on Nationalism and War,” in Brown et al., Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, 29-30.  
The institutional nationalism of Milosevic and Tudjman supplied the torch for the tinder of ethnic hatreds 
in Yugoslavia; see Warren Zimmermann quoted in Holbrooke, 24. 
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above all the unification of the formerly divided continent. This mental predisposition 
stood in marked contrast to the downward spiral of former Yugoslavia into violent ethno-
nationalism, segregation and war.60 
After the first multiparty elections in Bosnia-Herzegovina in November 1990, the 
large ethnic parties formed a coalition government as a democratic alternative to the prior 
Socialist government. The parties organized a power sharing arrangement along ethnic 
lines, installing a Muslim president, a Bosnian Serb president of the parliament and a 
Croat prime minister. However, after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence in 
1991, the Bosnian government was urged to organize a referendum for independence.61 
Voters supported independence, but the majority of Bosnian Serbs boycotted the 
referendum, an ominous signal of what was to come. On March 5, 1992, the Bosnian 
parliament declared Bosnia’s independence. Full scale war broke out in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. After the JNA retreated, most of its weaponry, including heavy artillery, 
remained in Bosnia, along with the command structure and high ranking military 
personnel. The equipment and personnel became the backbone of the Bosnian Serb 
irregulars, the Army of Republika Srbska.62  
Despite inferior manpower the Bosnian Serb Army had the military advantage 
with heavy artillery and modern equipment.63 Within days they gained control over 
regions with Serb majorities. The aim of their first strikes was to connect the five 
scattered Serb majority regions and unite this area with the homeland, the new Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). Within the first weeks of the war, the Army of Republika 
Srbska controlled over 70 percent of Bosnia-Herzegovina.  Rural and urban regions came 
swiftly under Serb control. Exceptions were the larger cities of Sarajevo, Mostar, and 
                                                 
60 Biermann, Lehrjahre im Kosovo, Das Scheitern der internationalen Krisenprävention vor 
Kriegsausbruch, 228. 
61 The Bosnian referendum for independence increased ethnic polarization and stood in stark contrast 
to the power sharing arrangements established after the multiparty elections in 1990. 
62 Jeffrey S. Lantis, Strategic Dilemmas and the Evolution of German Foreign Policy since 
Unification (Westport: Praeger Publishers, 2002), 85. 
63 Erich Rathfelder argues that the Army of Republika Srbska involved around 42,000 men in March 
1992. More than 200,000 men volunteered for the Bosnian Army (ARBiH). Not all volunteers were drafted 
caused by the lack of weapons and ammunition; see Erich Rathfelder, “Der Krieg an seinen Schauplätzen,“ 
in: Der Jugoslawien-Krieg Handbuch zu Vorgeschichte, Verlauf und Konsequenzen, edited by Melcic, 353. 
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Srebrenica, with their significant Muslim majorities and organized Bosnian defenses. 
Over a nearly-four year period, the siege of the cities varied in intensity but maintained 
determination to break the Bosnian forces in order to push through Serb demands. The 
Bosnian Serb forces encircled Sarajevo, preventing humanitarian relief convoys from 
entering while terrorizing and bombarding the civilians in the city.  
During the long cold winter of 1992-93, the front lines were entrenched between 
the Bosnian Army (ARBiH) and the Army of Republika Srbska. But the Bosnian Serbs 
shrugged off the slow advance of their forces and exploited the increased fighting 
between the Croat Army (HVO) and the ARBiH. In the long siege of Mostar, the ARBiH 
tried to defend the city against both the Croat and the Bosnian Serb armies. 
In March 1994, the U.S. and German governments brokered a peace between 
Croatia and Bosnia that established the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, reducing 
the belligerents in the war to two.64 The war continued until Croat offensives in Eastern 
Slavonia and Krajina drove the Serb and United Nations forces out of Western Slavonia, 
Smyrnia and Krajina. This was followed by the Croat attack on Serb strongholds in 
Bosnia which severely tipped the balance of power on the ground and, together with 
NATO’s operation Deliberate Force, allowed the Bosnjak-Croat Federation to gain the 
military initiative. Having rejected all international peace plans, the Serbs finally had to 
compromise.65  Peace negotiations in Dayton, Ohio in November 1995 concluded with 
the signing of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 




                                                 
64 Erich Rathfelder, “Der Krieg an seinen Schauplätzen,“ 360. 
65 The Croat offensives in Eastern-Slavonia and the Krajina had multiple ramifications. First, they 
removed the myth of the invincibility of Serb forces. Second, the Croat army took the heaviest burden off 
NATO’s shoulders by commencing the ground offensive; NATO had refrained for months from taking this 
last step that drew the Serbs to the negotiation table. Finally, the Croat offensive created a fait accompli for 
the negotiations in Dayton because compromises about Krajina and Eastern-Slavonia became obsolete. See 
Biermann, Lehrjahre im Kosovo: Das Scheitern der internationalen Krisenprävention vor Kriegsausbruch, 
467-469. 
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B. COMPLEXITY AND INTENSITY  
In the Bosnian war, issue density and issue duration were responsible for the 
complexity and intensity of the war as well as for its effects.66 It was an intra-state war on 
the European continent, and it was ethnically motivated. Both phenomena are familiar 
today, but were new to the policymakers of the early 1990s. In an era where nationalism, 
ethnicity, and war seemed part of the distant past, the sheer quantity and quality of 
ethnically motivated atrocity, destruction and displacement complicated the 
understanding of the Bosnian war. The “democratization of the means of destruction” 
made control of unofficial violence almost impossible.67 The international actors' diverse 
historical, political and economic ties inhibited impartial judgments, and misled and 
sometimes even handcuffed their crisis management activities.68 The war itself was not 
the fault of the international community. It was planned and waged by Yugoslavs with 
"nothing to gain but everything to lose from a peaceful [state] transition.”69  
In the war, Serbia supported the Army of Republica Srpska. The Army of the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the de facto Bosnjak army, fought for an independent 
Bosnian state, while Croatia supported the Croat forces of Herzeg-Bosna. This led to 
ongoing debate over whether the conflict should be treated as a civil war or a war of 
aggression. Belgrade claimed the conflict was a civil war, while Croatia and the Bosnian 
government perceived the war as a war of aggression by Serbia. A variety of paramilitary 
groups were involved, supported by Serbia and Croatia and volunteers from each country.  
 
 
                                                 
66 Celeste A. Wallander and Robert O. Keohane, “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions," in 
Imperfect Union: Security Institutions over Time and Space, edited by Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. 
Keohane and Celeste A. Wallander (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 31-32.  
67 Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1996), 561. 
68 The Serb political leadership, and specifically the political ambitions of Milosevic, were 
underestimated. Milosevic was perceived as a pro-Western politician, but his political strategy was to 
extend his control over the Yugoslav state, compromising with critics in the wake of his radical policies. 
Serbia's strong nationalistic orientation was also misjudged. Thus, the belief that the Yugoslav state could 
solve its domestic crisis on its own reflects a failure of the Western community. See Biermann, Lehrjahre 
im Kosovo: Das Scheitern der internationalen Krisenprävention vor Kriegsausbruch, 314-319. 
69 Silber and Little, 25. 
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The paramilitary forces were supported by national right-wing political parties like the 
Serbian Radical Party. It is even alleged that Croat and Serb secret police were engaged 
in the conflict. 
The topography of Bosnia-Herzegovina made large ground force intervention 
almost impossible. The mountainous terrain and virtually impassable regions made 
modern warfare, specifically air strikes, very difficult, but favored guerilla warfare. 
Memories of the war in Indochina and Vietnam scared off third party military 
interventions, as did the World War II myth of superior Serb fighting and guerilla war 
skills. Bosnia-Herzegovina's ethnic patchwork quilt made it difficult to establish a clear 
military front, so combined military intervention was also difficult. High losses were 
expected from any ground offensive. The Western community was not willing to 
sacrifice ground troops in combat in such an environment. Bismarck's comment that “the 
Balkans were not worth the bones of a single Pomeranian grenadier” echoed through 
parliaments and military headquarters throughout the Western community.70  
C. THE ROLE OF MEDIA 
Satellite technology and the proliferation of networks, like Cable News Network 
(CNN) that present news around the clock have led to the so-called "CNN effect."  Visual 
images have far greater power to shape perceptions than printed media and reach a 
broader audience. The highly competitive news industry offers images via cable to the 
public so quickly that pressure on politicians and foreign policy is increased.71 The video 
showing a U.S. Army Ranger’s body being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu had 
an adverse effect on the Clinton administration’s willingness to stay in Somalia and 
derailed its 1993-1994 foreign policy agenda.72 Once the conflict turned violent in 
Slovenia and Croatia, news coverage became intensive and highly emotional, featuring 
                                                 
70 Christopher Cviic, Remaking the Balkans (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), 
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71 Margaret H. Belknap, The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational Risk? (U.S. Army War 
College, Strategy Research Project, 2001), http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/cnn-
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heartrending scenes of bloodshed that confirmed the media adage, “if it bleeds it leads.”73 
The CNN effect played a crucial role in arousing public opinion, and seemed to frame the 
international response by seizing decisions about statecraft and the use of force from the 
hands of a few. United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Ghali referred to CNN as the 
“sixteenth member of the Security Council," saying "The member states never take action 
on a problem unless the media take up the case.”74 Because the world was watching as 
the atrocities in Bosnia-Herzegovina unfolded, Western policymakers were under great 
pressure to respond rapidly. 
Few international events after World War II had such great impact on the 
European and American public and political elites as the war in Bosnia. The media vied 
to present news and images of the mass exoduses, the death camps, ethnic cleansing and 
organized rapes. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) like Amnesty International 
and Human Rights Watch witnessed the atrocities in Bosnia; their reports had dramatic 
ramifications among international actors.75 Western political elites who visited the 
Balkans returned bewildered and worried, shocked by the desperate and violent 
situation.76  Western living rooms were flooded with images of atrocities like Serb 
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76 See Holbrooke's memoirs; Holbrooke, 34-54. 
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escape.  Seeing what Silber and Little call the “blackened skeletons of buildings [that] 
shape Sarajevo’s skyline” caused fierce discussions in the international and domestic 
political debate.77  
The Serb refugees who escaped the Croatian advance in 1995 were among the 
largest exoduses caused by war since the World War II. Half of the Bosnian population 
was gone, having fled or been expelled or killed. At the beginning of the war, the 
Bosnian Serb forces attacked the Muslim minorities in eastern Bosnia. Following the 
successful occupation of towns and villages, the Muslim population was captured by the 
military or special police forces, or was handed over by Serb civilians. Women and men 
were separated and isolated in detention camps. Men were generally deported, tortured or 
killed without trial. Women suffered unhygienic and inhumane conditions, and were 
mistreated and raped periodically by paramilitary units and police forces. Rape became 
an instrument for use in ethnic warfare.78 Rape demoralized and humiliated the Bosnian 
population; it was used as a weapon with the intent of changing the ethnic demography of 
the whole country. Often family members were forced to watch the rapes of their 
beloved.79 Eyewitness accounts and reports of refugees claimed that women were raped 
"everywhere and at all times, and victims [were] of all ages, from six to eighty.”80 
Muslim houses and properties were burnt down, destroyed or given to the Serb 
population. The Western media documented eyewitness accounts of the genocide against 
the Muslims of Bosnia. By June 1992 they were showing mass civilian deportations and 
executions in Serb military and paramilitary death camps.81 Day after day, the media 
showed atrocities taking place in the middle of Europe.  
Ethnic cleansing was the most common atrocity of the Bosnian war. Undesired 
Muslim groups were intimidated or deported from whole regions, or were killed 
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arbitrarily. Bosnian Serb military and paramilitary units and civilians destroyed unwanted 
physical signs of Muslim identity like as cemeteries and places of worship. The Army of 
Republika Srbska slaughtered the entire civilian male population of Srebrenica, 8,000 
people, within a week of occupying the city. The basis of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia was 
not “primordial hatreds or local jealousies” but political goals.82 The aim of ethnic 
cleansing, particularly in eastern Bosnia, was to terrify Muslim minorities and to force 
their escape into larger central enclaves like Srebrenica which were periodically attacked 
with heavy artillery. The overall death toll of the Bosnian war is around 102,000, 
including 55,000 civilians. Most fatalities were Muslim minorities in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. 
In sum, two factors explain the transmittance of the Bosnian war to the Western 
community. Formative events, like the bombing of the Sarajevo market square during the 
siege and the Srebrenica massacre, spurred international condemnation. Second and 
equally striking was the effect of the war as a whole. The issue density of single atrocities 
along with the issue duration of the war attracted the press and media. 
D. INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT 
What the publics in Europe remember from the Bosnian war is the sense of 
political impotence that surrounded the handling of the crisis. The western governments 
and the UN sought a diplomatic solution while conducting a peacekeeping mission 
(UNPROFOR) in an escalating conflict and humanitarian nightmare. A classical UN 
peacekeeping operation, authorized during an unfolding war, tried not to solve but to 
contain the conflict, i.e. to alleviate human suffering and avert spill-over into the 
neighborhood. In other words, “the problem in Yugoslavia was not how to police a peace 
but rather how to establish one.”83  
                                                 
82 Gagnon argues that a violent conflict is not caused by ethnic sentiments, but rather by the dynamics 
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also Woodward, 242. 
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Early misperceptions hindered an effective response. American warnings of an 
outbreak of war channeled through NATO were “muted” by the European Community. 84 
Silence reigned on the diplomatic front prior to April 1991, partly due to misperceptions 
of the forces in Yugoslavia.85 
Paradoxically, the outbreak of the war caught the European Community by 
surprise, whether knowingly or unknowingly. Its reaction was hasty and overambitious, 
caused by uncertainty and a misperception of the conflict. In June 1991, the Dutch 
Foreign Minister, Hans van den Broek, declared the crisis on the Balkans to be a 
European matter, saying "We do not interfere in American affairs; we trust America will 
not interfere in European affairs."86 Washington would be kept informed but not 
consulted, according to Gianni de Michelis, Foreign Minister of Italy. The U.S. was more 
than happy to retreat after the visit of Secretary of State James Baker to Belgrade in June 
1991 and the first Iraq war. While eyes focused on the Persian Gulf, the Bush 
administration was also committed to the Yugoslav status quo as means to prevent the 
break up of the Soviet Union and generalized chaos in Europe.   
A variety of different trans-Atlantic organizations were involved in the crisis 
management. The self-confident claim that Balkan wars are European business and that 
the EC would refuse involvement by other organizations and states demobilized the 
United States and thus NATO.87 The EC misperceived the Yugoslav War as a 
manageable crisis, especially after the initial success of the Brioni agreement for 
Slovenia. The United Nations, also first successful with ending the war in Croatia (Vance 
Plan), was soon overwhelmed by the war's complexity and unable to deploy effective ad 
hoc military forces. With the Security Council unwilling to equip UN units with peace 
enforcing mandates, the UN maneuvered itself into a deadlock. The Protection Force of 
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the United Nations (UNPROFOR) had a mandate to prevent conflict and was specifically 
equipped for that mission. Neither the armaments nor the mandate itself were sufficient to 
enforce peace between the belligerents. As a whole, UNPROFOR could not stop the war; 
it “lacked the firepower to halt the fighting and stop the slaughter.”88 Thus the UN was 
confined to damage limitation and engaged in no full-fledged conflict resolution.89 The 
consensus-based CSCE likewise proved incapable of halting the atrocities. Early 
diplomatic efforts by the EC and CSCE assumed a functioning, undivided Yugoslav 
state.90 Different institutions were focused on their respective areas of responsibility with 
little cooperation among them. With Europe still preoccupied with internal 
transformation, what was needed to manage a complex crisis, the concept of 
“interlocking institutions,” simply did not exist.91 That said, international involvement 
also lacked effective, goal oriented cooperation. 
Various plans for peace were drawn up throughout the Balkan war.92 The London 
Conference in August 1992 outlined broad principles to end the war. The international 
actors agreed to establish the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) as a 
permanent bargaining forum co-chaired by the EC (David Owen, later Carl Bildt) and the 
UN (Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, followed by Thorvald Stoltenberg).93 The ICFY 
declared Serb forces the main aggressor, threatened the use of military force, and insisted 
that international borders be recognized in the conflict. It proved an effective forum for 
coordinated diplomatic responses to the war, and it presented the first plans to end the 
war in Bosnia, the Vance-Owen Plan.94 However, the Vance-Owen Plan, which 
originated in “efforts to reduce friction among international actors,”95 could be rejected 
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by the Bosnian Serb parliament in Pale because of internal divisions in the West, and 
specifically because it was rejected by the Clinton administration.96 The later Owen-
Stoltenberg Plan likewise failed. 
Overall, more than thirty countries and their armed forces, coordinated by the UN, 
NATO, and WEU, were involved in the peace keeping effort. They carried out six 
different missions established by UN Resolutions.97 The complexity of the military 
intervention required strict coordination and an agreed framework for civil-military 
cooperation, neither of which existed in the first years of the Bosnian war.98  
The growing understanding of the importance of a coherent international 
diplomatic effort and specifically of the “need to harmonize policy” led to the creation of 
the Contact Group in early 1994.99 German diplomatic efforts encouraged Russia to 
participate in the forum. The Contact Group was created to facilitate coordination among 
the U.S., Russia, Germany, France and Great Britain, to “formulate a coherent strategy in 
Bosnia,” and to diminish the differences among the main actors.100 It followed a hard and 
consistent line of negotiations, setting up the Contact Group Peace Plan.101 Whereas the 
Contact Group acted as a forum for the great powers, it also demonstrated the necessity 
of coordination among international organizations.102 Led by NATO, and thus the U.S., 
the Contact Group sidelined the UN and the EU whose diplomatic efforts were long 
exhausted.  In the fall of 1995, NATO finally acted to enforce peace in the war-shattered 
Bosnia with effective and resolute military engagement backed by coordinated 
diplomacy. 
                                                 
96 The U.S. was not willing to accept a commitment to be prepared to implement the Vance-Owen 
Plan even partly; see Gow, 258. 
97 Gow, 129. 
98 Gow argues that peacekeeping is an element of peace support, which in Clausewitzian terms is 
“continuation of policy by other means.” Peace support denotes military operations under the primary 
purpose of international diplomacy; see Gow, 127. 
99 Gow, 156. 
100 Mockaitis, 104. 
101 The peace plan was a "take it or leave it" proposition, with rewards when it was followed and 
punishments when it was ignored. 
102 Christoph Schwegmann, The Contact Group and its Impact on the European Institutional 
Structure, 8. 
 30
Four years of the worst fighting in post-World War II Europe thus ended in 
precisely the way the Western Alliance had said it could not end: NATO enforced peace 
by attacking the major aggressor.103 Early international actions had benefited the Serbs 
and Croats and, by definition, hurt the Bosnjaks. Permanent aggression by the Republica 
Srbska Forces was obscured by the international decision to claim a neutral position early  
in the conflict by designating all belligerents in the conflict as responsible.104 It took 
extensive NATO air strikes and 60.000 heavy armed combat troops to make and keep the 
peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The international community took almost four years to stop the slaughter in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. There are many reasons why the international organizations and 
their principals were reluctant to intervene in a forceful and coordinated fashion. There 
were many disagreements among on how to handle the crisis. The European states had 
more in common with one another than with the United States.105 This was obvious with 
European efforts to involve Russia and to maintain a strict arms embargo, in contrast to 
American efforts to tip the military balance in favor of the perceived victims, the 
Bosnjaks. They did share reluctance to send ground troops into combat, a desire to 
alleviate the impact of the war, and the aspiration to work multilaterally. However, the 
multilateral approach suffered from lack of effective cooperation and coordination. 
Multiple misperceptions led to unenthusiastic crisis management focused on 
diplomacy. Uncertainties and instability hindered strong and coherent attention to crisis 
prevention and conflict resolution. The complexity and intensity of the war in Bosnia 
deterred international action. Historical and economic ties inhibited impartial intervention 
and tied the hands of the states involved. The atrocities and the fighting during the 
Bosnian war made understanding the conflict complicated; in the early years, most 
international actors closed their eyes to the atrocities against the Bosnjaks. On the other  
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hand, the humanitarian nightmare spurred rethinking and oriented the international 
community towards more effective intervention. Reunited Europe's enthusiasm contrasts 
dramatically with the violence of the Bosnian war. From the European perspective, it was 
unthinkable that nationalism and ethnic warfare, banished since 1945, would arise again 
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IV. GERMAN SECURITY CULTURE TRANSFORMED 
In an interview on February 7, 1992, German Chancellor Helmut Kohl said, 
“Germans should not be the first to stick their neck out. One will not be overlooked even 
if one remains a bit more in the background.”106 This reflects the traditional “culture of 
restraint” that has dominated German foreign and security policy since 1949 and had just 
been affirmed by the German refusal to contribute troops to the UN-mandated 
international coalition to force Iraq back out of Kuwait. In March, fierce attacks in 
eastern and northwestern Bosnia ushered in one of the most violent and destructive 
conflicts since the Second World War. The subsequent three years of war would have a 
profound impact on German security culture. Almost four years later, in a parliamentary 
speech on December 6, 1995, Kohl declared that “the international community’s 
expectations of unified Germany are different from those placed upon the old Federal 
Republic.” Germany today, he said, “must stand alongside them in preserving peace,” 
adding that Germany “must not and can not withdraw from such a mission.”107  Eight 
days later the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords ended the cruel, ferocious and 
complex war in Bosnia, and Germany for the first time contributed its Bundeswehr to an 
international peace building operation. The Bosnian war was a political shock experience 
with far-ranging repercussions for German society and political elites. Germany's security 
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culture, which until 1992 did not recognize the legitimacy of employing German forces 
for foreign policy reasons other than national and collective defense, was transformed by 
the war.  
The Bosnian war presented Germany with a challenge (perceived by some as an 
opportunity) to reshape its foreign policy by assuming more responsibility in 
international affairs. This became visible in regard to the culture of restraint that had 
guided German international activities throughout the Cold War. With the Bosnian war in 
Europe’s backyard, German society and political leadership were caught in a strategic 
dilemma between humanitarianism and history, between “Idealpolitik” and “Realpolitik,” 
which required rethinking security and military policy. The core elements of German 
foreign policy had overall remained intact after reunification. Since there was no break 
with the past, German foreign policy had a high degree of continuity and moderation, and 
the political culture adjusted slowly to the new responsibilities of an enlarged Germany. 
The changing international environment, specifically the Bosnian war experience, 
accelerated changes in the traditional security culture that was increasingly at odds with 
the post-Cold War reality. 
A. GERMAN HISTORY AND FOREIGN POLICY PREDISPOSITIONS 
This section examines the sources and development of German security culture 
after World War II, emphasizing the rationale for Germany's cultural preferences and 
explaining the cultural predispositions of the German public and political elites.  
Germany’s long and varied history and its “past transgressions”108 have long 
lasting ramifications on its foreign policy. As the aggressor in both world wars and 
perpetrator of “made in Germany” violence, atrocities, slaughter, and genocide during 
national socialist rule, Germans have long been perceived by their critics as by nature 
“subservient to authority, militaristic, and aggressive.”109 After World War II, European 
neighbors perceived a defeated Germany as “a mutable, Proteuslike, unpredictable 
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country, particularly dangerous when it is unhappy.”110 “Incertitudes Allemagne,” a 
standard phrase in France throughout the Cold War, was revived again during German 
unification. Those historically conditioned attitudes constrained West Germany’s foreign 
policy, as did the Soviet ideological and military threat, the dependence on the United 
States for security, and the partition into West and East. Those constraints were 
intensified by being geostrategically positioned in the “Mittellage”111 between U.S.-
NATO and USSR-Warsaw Pact. Desiring both strong Western ties and a foreign policy 
that would not antagonize the Soviet Union, West Germany was stuck in a strategic 
dilemma. The subject of East Germany exceeds the scope of this study and has been 
treated elsewhere.112 
Thus, Germany had no desire to flex its muscles with the kind of nation-state 
independence often demonstrated by France and especially the United States. Or the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) did so in a manner that was barely perceptible as 
muscle flexing, even when in fact it was, e.g. Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik in the early 1970s 
or Helmut Schmidt’s call for missiles in 1977. Konrad Adenauer, the first post-war 
German Chancellor, had already formulated the principle guidelines of German post-War 
foreign policy. The essence was an extraordinary focus on multilateral diplomacy within 
international institutions and integration into the European project. Thus, Germany could 
gain new prestige and leverage in world affairs without arousing its suspicious war-time 
enemies and new friends. In fact, soon Germans perceived this stress on multilateralism 
as the only legitimate way to global peace. Adenauer adopted a completely Western-
oriented foreign policy, dubbed “Westbindung.” In the Grand Coalition of 1966-69, 
Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich Genscher (1974-1992) developed what he called 
“Verantwortungspolitik,” a foreign policy of responsibility, “oriented around the themes 
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of restraint, humanitarianism and multilateral cooperation.”113 Later this policy 
orientation was dubbed “Genscherism,” with some pejorative, ironic undertones, 
especially in the United States. German foreign and security culture was based on a 
“Kultur der Zurückhaltung,” culture of restraint, a term also coined by Genscher and 
accepted by his successor Klaus Kinkel. This culture of restraint focused on diplomacy 
and was strongly skeptical about the use of force, renouncing the use of any military 
force beyond the collective defense obligation of NATO. This was based on a consensual 
reading of the German Basic Law up to the 1990s. Harnessed multilaterally, by 1990 
Germany had rehabilitated itself within international institutions and became the 
strongest advocate of European integration, participating in the Common Market, 
Political Union and European Political Cooperation, and as a recognized member of 
NATO and the United Nations. 
In sum, German foreign and security policy was exceptional and radically 
different from that of other countries in Europe especially that of the UK and France.114 
German exceptionalism is based on the unique national security culture that developed in 
response to the fallacies of Hitler's Germany. Germany was perceived as a reluctant 
power, a pressured power, definitely as a civilian power (despite the fighting power of the 
Bundeswehr by the 1980s), and as a World power forsaken.115 During the Cold War, 
Germany pursued its national interests in a non-threatening and low-profile way based on 
the culture of restraint.116  
The “new world order,” a term coined at the end of the First World War, 
predicted a new period of history with dramatic changes in political thought and the 
balance of power. The unexpected decline of the Soviet Empire involved the world in a 
similarly dramatic political transformation. This new world order harnessed new concepts 
and expectations, such as the replacement of containment with superpower cooperation. 
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This cooperation among a new, more unified Europe could focus on reducing armaments 
and troop deployments, settling regional disputes, stimulating economic growth, diffusing 
democratic governance, lessening East-West trade restrictions, spreading 
humanitarianism and protecting the environment. In this context, German foreign policy 
culture seemed perfectly prepared. In Europe, German reunification was seen as part of 
this new world order. 
It was hoped that the new world order would be based on principles of political 
liberty, self-determination, non-intervention and integration and would refrain from using 
military force, which was viewed as a threat by many in Germany. The ideals of the new 
world order help to explain the weak German reaction at the outbreak of the Bosnian war.  
After reunification in 1990, Germany was expected to respond more 
independently, freed from the handcuffs of history, especially in regard to the deployment 
of its armed forces in multilateral peacekeeping efforts. One should keep in mind that the 
Kuwait annexation of August 1990 unfolded just as the “two-plus-four negotiations” on 
German unification were coming to a climax. Lantis notes: “Neorealists predicted that the 
Federal Republic would soon 'normalize’ its foreign policy by taking on a more assertive 
foreign profile focused on strategic interests, backed by the threat of the use of force.”117  
The leading figure of this school, John Mearsheimer, flatly predicted that Germany would 
seek nuclear weapons.118 Germany’s foreign policy was indeed changing since 1989. The 
way the Kohl government conducted—perhaps even dominated—the German internal 
unification process as well as the “two-plus-four negotiations,” went beyond the culture 
of restraint. Also, the manner in which Germany imposed its will on its European 
partners concerning recognition of Croatia and Slovenia seemed to signal a new German 
assertiveness on the diplomatic front. Militarily, German security policy was more 
cautious, yet also slowly transforming. Germany supported the operation in the Persian 
Gulf in 1991 financially and provided logistical support to Turkey and Israel; further it 
contributed military forces to the UN operations in Cambodia and Somalia in 1993, and it 
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strongly advocated diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991.119 But the 
traditional political norms and values limited German participation in international crisis 
management in the early phase of this national realignment of diplomacy and strategy. 
Public opinion was hostile to German military power and the use of force which was seen 
in exclusively tragic terms. Germany was reluctant to contribute its Bundeswehr to 
international operations, even if UN mandated, and at the same time lacked the will 
actively to oppose the interventions of the traditional powers. The political leadership 
refused to support Operation Desert Storm with German forces because of the still 
unchallenged domestic political consensus that the German Basic Law, especially Article 
87a, prohibited using military force outside NATO territory. The consensus among 
parties as well as lawyers was that Germany should stick to its traditional political 
boundaries.120 
Germany had built strong economic ties and a special relationship with 
Yugoslavia during the Cold War if not before when one considers the Habsburg legacy. 
As Yugoslavia's largest trading partner, Germany took the lead in rescheduling the debts 
of the Balkan republic.121 The strong social and economic relationship was evident in the 
hundreds of thousands of guest workers in Germany, the German tourists at the Adriatic 
coast, and numerous city partnerships.122 Germany was a strong advocate that 
Yugoslavia be among the first to sign an association agreement with the European 
Community and the Visegrad countries in 1990. During the outbreak of the Balkan war in 
1991 the EC still signed the third financial protocol with Yugoslavia to extend credits. 
Fifty years earlier, in April 1941, German ties with the Balkan had been of a different, 
tragic kind. Germany became involved “directly in Balkan affairs… when Hitler ordered 
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the invasion and occupation of the region.”123 After only eleven days, Yugoslavia 
surrendered unconditionally. The German forces were supported by radical Croat 
nationalists, the Ustashes, in their struggle against mainly Serb nationalistic groups, 
called Chetniks, and Communist partisans.124 Italians and Germans created the only 
Greater Albania in history to counterbalance the Serb resistance. Germany thus ushered 
in the civil war in Yugoslavia which cost millions of lives until the Germans withdrew in 
1944. This was still in the mind of policymakers like Helmut Kohl, who in the early 
1990s urged restraint in German Balkan policy in the early 1990s. 
Still, the Balkan war increasingly challenged German security culture and 
triggered a fundamental reorientation of its foreign policy.125 First, reunited Germany had 
to redefine its national foreign policy aims, including its relation to international partners 
within the Euro- and Transatlantic alliances and organizations. Second, reunited Germany 
had to decide whether it was able and willing to carry more responsibility in international 
crisis management, specifically military responsibility. This clearly was expected by its 
partners, who during the first Gulf War heavily criticized the German policy of 
“Scheckbuchdiplomatie,” paying of war expenses without contributing forces. The 
reorientation process had a direct impact on German foreign policy at the outbreak of the 
Balkan wars. Domestic problems associated with foreign policy transformation were not 
resolved in 1991, and Germany's focus was thus more internal than external. 
In sum, modern German history accounts for its singular foreign policy during the 
Cold War. Germany was restrained by its own past and by the international environment, 
which saw Germany as a potential threat and as an ally against Soviet imperialism. 
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German foreign policy was pursuing international rehabilitation through integration and 
cooperation, rather than purely national interests and objectives by power politics alone. 
During the Cold War, Germany developed a unique “military strategic culture” which 
included a large military force to bear its burden of territorial defense within treaty 
obligations, but refused to participate in any out-of-area operations which were seen as 
neo-imperialist undertakings.126 Thus restrictions on the use of military force “became 
deeply rooted in the public psyche.”127 The strict interpretation of the Basic Law served 
this purpose. After reunification, the internal and external conditions changed and 
German political and security culture became less homogeneous. Lantis writes, a “new 
consensus emerged among American scholars that Germany’s political culture of 
reticence—not systemic characteristics—would define its foreign affairs profile.”128 
They claimed that explaining German security policy development required using 
concepts such as political and security culture. 
B. GERMAN PREDISPOSITIONS AND EARLY PERCEPTIONS OF THE 
WAR 
Because the first signs of cultural changes were visible prior the outbreak of the 
Bosnian war, this section guides the reader through the early Balkan wars, examines the 
early German perception of the Bosnian war, and analyzes the impact of the wars in 
Croatia and Slovenia on German predispositions. A certain amount of overlap in the 
subsequent discussion cannot be avoided because the relevant predispositions of the 
German public and political elites are closely interrelated.  
The German foreign policy emphasis on responsibility and the culture of restraint 
is responsible for German public and elite predispositions and thus for their perceptions 
at the outbreak of the Bosnian war. Along with domestic predispositions, changing events 
in the new international environment and economic and social ties with the Yugoslav 
state explain the complexity of Germans' early views. 
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1. Predispositions and Perceptions Caused by German Domestic Policy 
The outbreak of the war in 1991 caused fierce discussions between the 
government and the opposition and within the political parties themselves. The war 
affected the German government and society almost immediately.129 Within a few weeks, 
about 20,000 refugees sought asylum in Germany, a figure which increased to 180,000 by 
the end of 1992.130 Germany gave asylum to 350,000 refugees from former Yugoslavia 
until 1995. The Bosnian war threatened to spill over to the former Yugoslav republics 
and provinces, especially to Macedonia, Kosovo and Sandzak, and further across the 
borders of former Yugoslavia into Albania, Bulgaria and Greece with their Serb and 
Muslim minorities. That would have involved NATO territory. While 54 percent of 
Germans thought that the war would remain isolated in the Balkans, 28 percent felt that 
the war might threaten overall European security.131 German politicians, listening to the 
rising public outrage in the larger capitals, negotiated for months on how to stop the war 
atrocities. 
The major domestic political debate focused on the constitutionality of German 
military forces being deployed in UN peacekeeping and NATO out-of-area missions.132 
Because of Tito’s split from the communist Soviet Union in 1948, the German Social 
Democrat Party (SPD) had a strong affinity to the Yugoslav state and thus hesitated to 
use force against Serb aggression. Furthermore, toward the end of the Cold War, the SPD 
had become strongly averse to the use of combat via military force, partly due to the 
myth that any military entanglement would endanger the fruits of the former 
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“Ostpolitik.”133 It was seen as having “potentially serious reverberations in [the] 
relationship with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.”134 This notion became 
internalized by all German political elites.  
In 1981, the government formed by the SPD and the German Liberal Party (FDP) 
took the position that a combat use of the Bundeswehr outside NATO territory was 
unconstitutional. Former Chancellor Helmut Schmidt and Foreign Minister Hans Dietrich 
Genscher accepted this interpretation, although “[t]here was, however, no consensus 
among constitutional scholars that such a restriction, in fact, existed.”135  The original 
clause in the Basic Law (Article 24) allowed the federal government to enter into a 
system of mutual collective security to maintain peace. The amendment of the mid-
1950s, Article 87(a), added that the use of German forces was only allowed for national 
defense.136 Thus, there was an inherent tension between the articles. While the Christian 
Democratic Party (CDU) and the Christian Social Party (CSU) focused on Article 24, the 
SPD upheld to the narrower interpretation of Article 87(a), rejecting any military 
engagement beyond NATO collective defense, including UN peacekeeping.137 In 1991, 
the CDU and the CSU, together with the FDP and the SPD, agreed on the need for a 
constitutional amendment to clarify the issue. But whereas the CDU and CSU advocated 
a broader interpretation concerning the use of force, the SPD insisted on a more narrow 
range of options. The dispute stalled the negotiations on the amendment. 
Within the SPD, aversion to military force became deeply rooted in party politics 
that had already been driven to extremes by the Intermediate Nuclear Forces Crisis of the 
                                                 
133 “Ostpolitik” describes a policy of rapprochement towards the Soviet Union and Central Eastern 
Europe, and specifically towards the German Democratic Republik (GDR), in order to normalize 
international relations with the region. It was first coined by Egon Bahr in 1963 and articulated as the main 
political aim during the chancellorship of Willy Brandt. It was not diametrically opposed to the former 
policy of “Westbindung” articulated by Konrad Adenauer, but was pursued by the Federal Republic of 
Germany to bridge the antagonism of the “Mittellage,” and to normalize and ease relationships between the 
two Germanys.  
134 Johnston, 270. 
135 Johnston, 270. 
136 Article 87(a) had been amended to incorporate a domestic emergency role. In 1968 the Federal 
Republic was not yet a member of the UN, and so no one considered the possibility of German forces 
participating in UN peacekeeping operations. See Nolte, 236. 
137 Johnston, 271. 
 43
early 1980s and the rise of the Greens. The party manifesto of the SPD, known as the 
“Berliner Programm,”138 focused on social equality, adjustment of the economy, ecology, 
and most importantly, peace politics. The manifesto stated that German armed forces 
were to be employed solely to defend German territory.139 Further, it stated that peace 
politics diminish the utility of the military as an instrument of policy overall. 
In June 1991, Kohl urged the German political parties “to participate in 
negotiations to restore the Yugoslav federation.”140 But strong emotional reactions and 
debate over Germany’s own reunification demanded another course of action. Pressure 
from German society141 and interest groups of Yugoslavian guest workers,142 along with 
the bias against military force and the will to internationalize of the conflict, drove Kohl 
and Genscher to early diplomatic recognition of Croatia and Slovenia. Together with 
other prevailing circumstances, the possibility of combat and involving German troops in 
an escalating conflict persuaded them “to pursue the diplomatic route of recognition.”143 
Public opinion perceived a strong contrast between domestic events and the international 
environment. While Germany grew larger with peaceful reunification, Eastern and South 
Eastern Europe turned towards disintegration and dissolution of the order stipulated in the 
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Paris suburb treaties of 1919.144 Paradoxically, the reunification of Germany and the 
dissolution of Yugoslavia were based on the same rationale: the right of national self 
determination.145 Thus the reunited Germany favored negotiations and recognition of 
Slovenia and Croatia while other European countries and the UN favored only a 
negotiated settlement.146 All German parties supported the diplomatic route of early 
recognition.147 Even the chief foreign policy spokesman of the SPD, Norbert Gansel, 
confirmed after visiting the Balkans that recognizing independent states would be more 
effective than a policy of pressure.148 The German effort to recognize Croatia and 
Slovenia early was based on the fact that “German leaders were more willing than other 
Europeans to verify Serbia as the aggressor in this conflict”149 and to see the others as 
victims. The German government did not see that recognizing the former Yugoslavian 
republics was a one-shot weapon. Nevertheless, in early 1992 other European states 
followed the German example of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia. Even the strongest 
advocate of Yugoslav integrity, the U.S., pursued this diplomatic course of action.  
Germany's strong economic and political relationship with Yugoslavia was 
specifically oriented towards Croatia, as most Yugoslav guest workers were of Croat 
descent. This perceived relationship was “vindicated by the relentless pursuit of conquest 
and ethnic cleansing by the Serbs.”150 This does not imply that the nationalistic policy of 
Tudjman’s Croatia was neglected by the German government. The Serb attack on the 
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Croat city Dubrovnik, an Adriatic attraction for thousands of German tourists and a 
World Cultural Heritage site, revived memories of the German conquest in World War II, 
as did the brutal attack on Vukovar.151 However, aspirations for a “Greater Croatia” were 
not accepted by Germany.152 
German public opinion in the first months of the war was divided and moderate 
because the war had just started and attention was still focused on domestic issues 
surrounding reunification. A public research institute found out that while 34 percent of 
the public thought that recognition of the Yugoslav republics would endanger European 
policy, 39 percent thought that recognition was the only way to handle the crisis.153  
The strong diversity of German political discourse highlights how the political 
parties found themselves caught between the peace rhetoric reflected in the “Berliner 
Programm” and the reality of the Balkan war. In retrospect, the war could not be settled 
without military force. Yet, the perception of the war was strongly influenced by 
domestic constraints. The culture of restraint predisposed the government to a diplomatic 
course of action. Political elites were constantly pressured by German society to take 
stronger action as the ethnic cleansing and the humanitarian tragedy unfolded. But the 
early German unilateralism of December 1991 was heavily criticized by other western 
governments.154 Especially the Bush administration took umbrage to the perceived 
Germany pushiness over Slovenia and Croatia, which ran counter to a policy of Brent 
Scowcroft and Lawrence Eagleburger that sought to uphold the southern Slav status quo.  
Germany's nonconformist unilateral recognition attempt created a firestorm of criticism 
from international actors. Norms create political benefits for conformity and costs for 
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nonconforming actions,155 which is evidenced by the European reaction to Germany's 
efforts. Adherence to multilateral norms, even knowing that it compromises 
effectiveness, is a testament to multilateralism. 
2. Predispositions and Perceptions Caused by the International 
Environment 
The main guideline for German foreign policy is the framework of rules and 
norms of International Organizations (IO). Due to its focus on multilateralism and 
integration, the Federal Republic is embedded in a close institutional web of IOs. On the 
one hand, Germany uses the framework of these organizations to pursue its national 
goals; on the other hand, institutional norms and rules restrict German foreign policy. 
Adenauer's Western orientated policy (Westpolitik) and Brandt's Eastern rapprochement 
policy (Ostpolitik) had lasting ramifications for German foreign policy and fostered its 
membership in various international organizations. The country followed a foreign policy 
of responsibility, even when the reunited Germany faced a fundamental reorientation of 
its foreign policy. Thus German predispositions towards the outbreak of the war have to 
be viewed through the lens of international organizations.  
The dissolution of Yugoslavia was perceived from outside Europe as a European 
problem. More importantly, the European states, especially Germany and France, wanted 
to solve the crisis with a European effort. During a European Council meeting in late 
1991, “western diplomats agreed that a fragmentation of the Yugoslavian federation 
would produce a complex mix of new challenges for economic and security relations in 
the region.”156 Thus, the European Community, including Germany and the U.S., 
fostered diplomatic negotiations to prevent dissolution of the Yugoslav state. Kohl and 
the parliament expected that EC diplomatic efforts to restore Yugoslavia would get strong 
domestic support. In fact, a research institute found out that 41 percent "trusted the 
European Community completely" to deal with the Balkan conflict, while 51 percent said 
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they trusted the EC to act appropriately.157 However, the percentage of Germans who 
saw the EC initiatives as not useful and inappropriate rose steadily.158 Public opinion 
pushed the German government to act. The unilateral decision to recognize Croatia and 
Slovenia caused fierce discussion in, and was not supported by, most EC members.159 
The Germans “faced an uphill battle and drew increasing criticism, even from their 
friends”160 and Germany was viewed as a “saboteur within the European 
Community.”161 The Federal Republic was even blamed by the international community 
for prompting the war in Bosnia with its unilateral recognition attempt.162 This 
accusation drove the German government into international passivity, even though its 
partners soon would adopt the German position on Milosevic and did not have any real 
alternative suggestion to keep the state together. In retrospect, the Bosnia verdict proved 
overdrawn.163 
The major event at the start of 1991 was the military intervention of allied forces 
against Iraq after its August 1990 invasion of Kuwait. The invasion of Kuwait presented 
Germany with a serious strategic dilemma in the midst of unification.164 On the one 
hand, the German government, perceiving the Iraq occupation of Kuwait as a serious 
violation of international law, wanted to support the UN and the U.S. On the other hand, 
political elites were conscious of Soviet sensitivities and were cautious about hindering 
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ongoing negotiations for German reunification and Soviet troop withdrawal. Germany's 
considerable financial and logistical support of Operation Desert Storm and the war in 
Iraq demonstrated its increased commitment to international security. However, 
deploying troops only to Turkey (not Kuwait), because this policy did not require 
amending the constitution, meant that Germany conformed to the culture of restraint, 
remained opposed to the use of force, and maintained negotiations with the Soviet 
Union.165 Opinion polls found that 71 percent supported military action by the allies 
against Iraq.166 After the Iraq war, trust in American political and military capabilities 
remained high.167  The Iraqi rocket assault on Israel also worked to open the perspective 
of the more conservative figures in the German security elite as to the violent realities of 
what was soon to become a new era of turmoil.  
The impact of the international environment, including multilateral obligations, 
rules and norms, is obvious. Germany was predisposed to act even more within the 
framework of international organizations after being blamed for its unilateral attempt to 
recognize Croatia and Slovenia. On the other hand, facing enormous domestic challenges 
from reunification and with its increased power, Germany had to act cautiously to avoid 
upsetting international actors.168  
To summarize, German foreign policy was influenced by several external and 
internal factors just prior to the outbreak of the Bosnian war. Societal pressure, domestic 
political consensus, historical reverberations, multilateral conformity and compatibility, 
historical and economic ties, and the problems associated with reunification all 
influenced Germany's perceptions and approach to the Bosnian war. 
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C. THE CHANGE IN GERMAN SECURITY CULTURE 
This section guides the reader through the Bosnian war. It links aspects of the 
war, as the independent variable, with culture bearing units in Germany, representing the 
security culture; it analyzes public opinion and political discourse. This section is divided 
into three subsections. The first explains the transmittance of the Bosnian war to 
Germany and the importance of refugees and other means of communication. The 
following two subsections examine the change of security culture and its repercussions 
during the later years of the war. The last two subsections are chronologically structured 
to demonstrate the relatively rapid changes in the cultural bearing units. 
In early 1994, two years before the Dayton agreement and three years after the 
outbreak of the war, the German political parties oriented their discourse and attitudes 
toward more effective involvement in and management of the Bosnian war, including the 
use of German military forces. This change was backed by steadily increasing public 
support for German political and military involvement. In the Bosnian war, Germany 
began to shed incrementally “some of its constitutional, if not political and psychological, 
inhibitions.”169 The acceptance of military involvement outside German territory and 
NATO commitments demonstrates a radical change in attitudes within German society 
and political parties. The transformation culminated in Germany's military contributions 
to peace enforcement in the late Bosnian war, the Kosovo war and in Afghanistan. 
1. The Role of Media and Refugees 
The media became an important factor in the Bosnian war. They publicized 
political and military events with lasting repercussions for public opinion and policy. 
This was a three-year war, not counting the war in Slovenia and Croatia, with continuous, 
day-to-day coverage dominating the headlines. Specifically, news and images of Serb-
built concentration camps as well as the siege of Sarajevo influenced attitudes, as did the 
bombing of Dubrovnik, the assault on Vukovar, the market place bombings in Sarajevo 
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and the pictures of French blue helmets chained to Serb artillery as hostages.170 Media 
influence is of course arguable. Its causal effect merges with many other stimuli that lead 
to changed behavior. Thus, it is said that the newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung 
was a catalyst for the government's early recognition attempt, a claim which major 
journalists of that paper in retrospect find doubtful.171 But clearly, the media and the 
CNN effect as well as reporting from NGOs like Amnesty International made the public 
aware of human rights abuses.172 The media was one reason that the Bosnian war was 
seen as occurring in the middle of Europe and thus requiring political action. After news 
coverage of attacks by demonstrators on Hans Koschnick, the former mayor of Bremen 
who was in 1994 EU Administrator for the divided city of Mostar, Koschnick was 
immediately recalled to Germany in a move similar to the later U.S. withdrawal from 
Somalia. Furthermore, the failure of the unarmed international police to safeguard 
Koschnick was a humiliation for Western policy.173 Germany, with its very high “media 
usage index,” was especially affected by the media and press. Between 70 and 80 percent 
of Germans view the daily news on television.174 The media as the transmitter of 
violence challenged public and elite beliefs. 
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina caused an exodus of about 1.5 million 
refugees.175 The 350,000 refugees from the Balkan region who sought asylum in 
Germany were seen as a large scale refugee crisis. The refugees were human rights 
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violations made visible.176 Through eyewitness accounts and personal reports of 
atrocities, they transmitted the war directly into German households and to the 
parliament. Political elites could not afford to ignore the brutality and human rights 
abuses that uprooted entire ethnic groups once the conflict was internationalized with the 
“large-scale movement of people across national borders, under duress.”177 The indirect 
economic costs of refugee relief and assistance were an additional burden to the costs of 
reunification. The federal administration had to process over 120,000 applications for 
asylum alone from the former Yugoslavia in 1992.178 The enormous amount of 350,000 
refugees had to be billeted and accommodated for nearly three years in Germany. In fact 
the German administration financially supported households who were willing to 
accommodate and host refugees. But the normal procedure was that refugees were 
billeted in abandoned military barracks, camps, and housing boats. Those indirect costs 
associated with the accommodation and general assistance of refugees caused disorder 
and stressed the government. The humanitarian catastrophe, combined with disorder 
caused by refugees, produced a stronger mandate for governmental intervention. 
2. The Impact of the Bosnian war 
The German government did not anticipate the Bosnian war even though the wars 
in Croatia and Slovenia were clear examples of what might happen in this ethnically most 
mixed of the Yugoslav republics. Only three months after the outbreak of the war, the 
UN asked Germany to provide logistical support for UNPROFOR and advised of the 
possible need to deploy German troops. With the Bosnian war the German government 
immediately faced the need to go beyond diplomacy.179 There was continual 
disagreement among the political parties on how to react to requests from the 
international community, with the strongest resistance from the SPD and the Greens. 
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However, after clarifying the constitutional issues and with public support, the parties 
achieved a revised consensus on foreign policy. 
a. Early Restraints on Use of the Military  
In July 1992, the Security Council mandated the deployment of NATO 
and WEU warships to the Adriatic Sea to monitor the UN-imposed embargo on former 
Yugoslavia in Operation Sharp Guard. Manfred Woerner, the Secretary General of 
NATO, asked the German government to support the embargo with military units. 
Germany was also asked to deploy troops for UNPROFOR. There was strong domestic 
political division over supporting the embargo in the Adriatic Sea and UNPROFOR. The 
CDU strongly supported the participation of German forces in the embargo and 
UNPROFOR.180 Its coalition partner, the FDP, had strong concerns for historical reasons. 
The SPD argued that participation of German forces was unconstitutional and that the 
Basic Law had to be changed first. The SPD expert on foreign policy, Karsten Voigt, 
criticized the CDU, claiming that its support was “evidence of a larger government plan 
to expand the role of the Bundeswehr on a global scale.”181 Hans Ulrich Klose, the 
faction leader in parliament and shadow Defense Minister, threatened to challenge the 
case in the Constitutional Court, saying the SPD would “not permit a sneaking movement 
towards combat missions around the world.”182 Public opinion opposed military 
entanglement. The Allensbach public research institute found that only 12 percent of 
West Germans and 8 percent of East Germans supported contributing troops for UN 
peace enforcement, whereas 50 percent and 40 percent of West and East Germans, 
respectively, supported purely UN “blue helmet” missions.183 
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The German government decided to send naval forces for ground and air 
patrols to support the embargo in the Adriatic Sea. Public opinion was unsettled with this 
decision and the government lost part of its electorate.184 CDU and FDP argued that 
contributing to international efforts was a political necessity. The FDP's historical 
concerns were countered by the Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel's claim that Germany 
should no longer behave like an “impotent dwarf.”185 However, support to UNPROFOR 
was denied. The German government “made clear that German forces were only to 
monitor commercial traffic” within the embargo and that they had to remain at least 15 
nautical miles off the Balkan coastline in international waters.186 Kohl's strategy toward 
this and other small scale deployments was, first, to let them be challenged in court to 
affirm their constitutionality; second, to implicitly change the interpretation of the Basic 
Law; third, to open the window for a gradual increase in troop deployments; and fourth, 
to change public opinion by dedicated but careful leadership.187 
b. Self Reflection 
The humanitarian situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate in the winter 
of 1992. The media showed war atrocities more frequently and an increasing number of 
refugees sought asylum in Germany. Information filtering out of Bosnia reveled that 
Bosnian-Serb forces practice “ethnic cleansing” and refuse to abide to the Geneva 
Convention, how to treat prisoner of war. International pressure on the Kohl 
administration became stronger and public opinion changed with more images of the 
atrocities. Researchers found meanwhile that 62 percent of Germans believed that the 
government should take a more assertive role in international affairs and 53 percent 
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believed that the German military should participate in peacekeeping operations without 
restraint.188 The agreement to participate in UN blue helmet missions rose accordingly to 
67 percent in West Germany and 55 percent in East Germany.189 In December 1992, 81 
percent said that Germany should work towards a common defense policy, while 75 
percent were for a common foreign policy of the EC.190 
In response to public attitudes, the German government began to reflect on 
the efficacy of a policy that increasingly seemed betwixt and between of an international 
environment devoid of perpetual peace. In a speech in September 1993, the Foreign 
Minister said that Germany should not criticize other actors trying to end the crisis in the 
Balkans while it does not want to carry a “heavier burden of responsibility in the 
region.”191 He himself was the politician in Germany most exposed to growing pressure 
from international partners to contribute more significantly to the peace effort in Bosnia. 
The SPD thought that its strict aversion to German forces in the Bosnian war was in the 
long term untenable. The parliamentary leader Hans Ulrich Klose claimed that the highly 
restrictive position of the SPD would make them “look ridiculous.”192 The opposition 
partner Green Party was stuck in a moral dilemma. On the one hand, the Greens 
represented the pacifist electorate in Germany and saw the pursuit of peace as among its 
most important goals. On the other hand, the prolonged war and violence in the Balkans 
showed the party that diplomatic efforts alone were not sufficient to stop the Bosnian 
war. 
With Resolution 781, the UN Security Council decided on a no-fly zone 
over Bosnia in October 9, 1992. The zone had to be controlled by NATO AWACS 
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accessed 17 April 2007. 
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aircraft. Ironically, not only were they stationed in Geilenkirchen, Germany, but almost a 
third of the early warning aircraft crews were German. The withdrawal of the German 
aircrews would have sacrificed their operational capability and thus the mission. It would 
have also dealt a serious blow to NATO cohesion and German responsibility in the 
Alliance. The AWACS crisis was another landmark in transforming German security 
culture. The CDU and FDP coalition faced its strongest challenge when the CDU 
unilaterally tried to amend the Basic Law to allow the use of military force. Foreign 
Minister Kinkel threatened in January 1993 that, due to the constitutional situation, the 
FDP would withdraw German aircrews from the AWACS mission, while CSU Chairman 
Theo Waigel called the FDP whiners.193 Yet the FDP successfully pressured its coalition 
partners CDU and CSU to accept a compromise and to amend the constitutional Basic 
Law. The amendment of Article 24 in the Basic Law was intended to bridge the gap 
between Article 24 and Article 87a. The amendment dealt with the deployment of 
German forces to UN peacekeeping missions, requiring that deployments receive 
majority support from the Bundestag. With the internal government compromise, the 
FDP finally agreed to the AWACS participation.  However, the SPD said the amendment 
would be “dead on arrival” and the Green party opposed to the AWACS deployment.194 
The SPD politicians warned the cabinet that the move was a step toward gunboat 
diplomacy (“einem Rückfall zur Denkweise der Kanonenbootdiplomatie des 
Wilhelminismus”).195 The SPD implied that German participation in AWACS aircraft 
had nothing to do with humanitarian intervention and was therefore unconstitutional. 
However, in 1993, the Constitutional Court decided in favor of German aircrew 
participating in the AWACS operation “Deny Flight.” The court based its decision on the 
fact that AWACS aircraft would not have operational capability without the German 
aircrews. Withdrawing German troops would seriously harm the success of the operation. 
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c. The Political Change 
With Germany's EC presidency in late 1993 and the establishment of the 
Contact Group in February 1994, Germany reentered the international scene. After the 
bombing raid on Sarajevo in the same month created “a firestorm of controversy in about 
how to respond,”196 German domestic attitudes changed dramatically. Public opinion 
held that the Bosnian Serb aggression was comparable with everything banned in 
Germany after the Second World War:  communism, nationalism and militarism and the 
repression of small states.  
Germany was asked unofficially to participate in air strikes with combat 
forces, specifically Tornado bombers for reconnaissance and suppression of enemy air 
defense. The Constitutional Court decided that German participation in UN-authorized 
international military operations outside NATO territory did not violate the 
constitution.197 This historical ruling ended the internal government debate about the 
constitutionality of using military force which had begun with the AWACS crisis in early 
1993. The objective of the federal Constitutional Court's ruling was to establish a definite 
judgment on the issue of German out-of-area troop deployments and the political 
requirements for such actions.198 While CDU/CSU and their coalition partner FDP 
argued that Germany must be involved with the UN operation to secure world peace, 
SPD and the Green Party continued to argue that the Basic Law prohibited out-of-area 
operations, which were seen as a dangerous foreign policy expansion.199 In July 12, 
1994, the Constitutional Court decided that the deployment of the Bundeswehr was 
permissible under Article 24 of the Basic Law. This decision closed the chapter on 
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jurisdictional struggle and put German foreign policy on a new path.200 On December 2, 
1994 the SPD leader Rudolf Scharping stated his opposition to using German Tornado 
jets over Bosnian territory, and foreign affairs expert Guenther Verheugen declared that 
NATO involvement in the conflict would increase atrocities, saying the SPD should 
refuse any deployment of German ground troops.201 
However, after the official NATO request to protect the UNPROFOR 
withdrawal with German military forces, the SPD political disposition changed to favor 
the deployment of forces for humanitarian purposes. Mirroring a traditional schism in the 
ranks of the German Social Democrats, some SPD politicians voiced full support for the 
NATO request.202 One week later, Scharping declared that his party would not oppose 
the German Tornado operations in support of an eventual UNPROFOR retreat and 
humanitarian relief convoys. This decision caused a rift in the SPD. The deputy party 
leader Wieczorek-Zeul argued that Scharping would willingly lead the SPD and Germany 
into war.203 To settle the dispute within his party, Scharping declared that the SPD did 
not decide in favor of NATO support, but that humanitarian relief must be considered. 
The issue required negotiation in the Bundestag, but two days before Christmas the 
government and the SPD opposition declared their full support for the NATO request, a 
decision with broad public support.204  
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The political parties displayed unity in the wake of the NATO request to 
support the UN withdrawal. Scharping condemned the Serb attacks and declared his 
agreement with government efforts to intervene more effectively.205  He also said that the 
SPD would support deploying military aircraft to protect UN relief flights.206  Even 
Klose characterized support for the air strikes as correct. Scharping was able to overcome 
disputes within the SPD with his emphasis on humanitarian aid and his tactical decision 
to withhold his final decision until just before Christmas, which increased his public 
support. Public opinion research found that 75 percent of Germans supported the use of 
military force for humanitarian purposes. This marked the greatest change in German 
policy and public attitudes during the war.  
3. The Repercussions of Change 
In 1995, the Bosnian war took on an added dimension. Pictures of the July 1995 
Srebrenica massacre were spread all over Europe. Croatia’s offensive against the Serb 
Army changed the power distribution in the Balkans. In May 1995, about 300 UN 
peacekeepers were taken as hostages. The Bosnian Serbs threatened to use them as 
human shields if the NATO air strikes persisted. The July 6 Serb artillery attack on 
Srebrenica caused the final change in German peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. The 
European governments and the North Atlantic Council members declared the actions of 
the Bosnian Serbs unacceptable and threatened that NATO forces would respond with the 
use of force. They “began to consider the deployment of ground troops to galvanize a 
diplomatic, political, economic, and military endgame in the conflict.”207 Those ground 
troops would consist of a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to safeguard UNPROFOR. 
Germany was asked to deploy German forces to the RRF. In addition to 
widespread public agreement on German responsibility in the Balkan crisis, there was a 
growing political consensus for military action. Polls showed that Germans strongly 
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supported active contribution to NATO missions. Between unification and 1995, public 
support for the alliance had increased steadily. Public support for NATO was 57 percent 
in 1991, but by 1995 it had increased to 71 percent. One survey institute found that 74 
percent of all respondents indicated that they would support NATO involvement in a new 
crisis on Europe’s periphery.208 The most significant change occurred within the political 
elites of the Green Party. Joschka Fischer, a member of the Green Party’s board of 
directors and later Foreign Minister in the SPD/Green Coalition, called for a redefinition 
of his strongly pacifist party's principles on foreign policy.209 During a conference on 
peacekeeping operations and German responsibilities in fall 1995, the Green Party for the 
first time considered how and when to deploy the German military for peace 
operations.210 In a historic speech, Fischer revoked the pacifist phrase “nie wieder 
Krieg,” never again war, changing it to “nie wieder Auschwitz,” never again Auschwitz.  
He thus introduced the need for military force in Green foreign policy.211 He contended 
that the party should support German contributions to peacekeeping blue-helmet missions 
to stop the atrocities in Bosnia while holding firm to nonviolence.212 His speech set 
Green Party politics on a new course and was path breaking for all of German foreign 
policy. 
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An editorial in the Berlin newspaper Tagesspiegel summed up the atmosphere, 
saying “the government’s decision has been made and it holds no surprises. Germany will 
participate in protecting the UN Blue Helmets in the former Yugoslavia. Although it 
sounds like a routine decision, in reality it marks the close of a chapter of German 
security policy.”213 Closing the chapter on the culture of restraint, Germany deployed 
1,500 German troops to Croatia and built logistical support and a field hospital to support 
the Implementation Force (IFOR). The decision to contribute German forces to IFOR 
passed the Bundestag by an overwhelming 543 to 107 votes with strong public 
support.214 The German contribution to IFOR, though still outside of Bosnia, consisted of 
heavy armored combat troops and special forces. 
D. CONCLUSION 
Comparing German security and defense policy before and after the Bosnian war, 
a drastic change is evident. The policy of restraint gave way to a policy more focused on 
Germany’s international responsibility, institutionally harnessed and multilaterally 
legitimized in the midst of an international system in flux and the return of war to Europe 
and its environs. Skepticism in German political culture about the use of German forces 
was reduced significantly, eclipsed by humanitarian concerns that were eventually 
accepted by the German left as well. The public bias against military entanglement was 
challenged by eyewitness accounts of refugees from ethnic cleansing, and the CNN effect 
brought images of war atrocities into German households well familiar with the locales 
and human faces of such violence. Faced with 350,000 refugees, domestic German policy 
noted that the “creation of refugees is most indisputably a creation of ‘international 
disorder.’”215 The world media reports of the Bosnian catastrophe and the “combination 
of humanitarian concerns and the impact of disorder" interacted synergistically to 
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produce broad acceptance of intervention and the use of military force.216 The media and 
refugees challenged images of a peaceful Europe and German pacifist ideas. 
The guiding principles and behavior of German foreign policy are based on both 
external and internal dimensions. The examination of foreign policy requires linking the 
internal predispositions, such as values, norms, and culture, with the international 
environment. In other words, foreign policy change depends strongly upon compatibility 
and consensus. Compatibility accounts for “the degrees of feasibility of various foreign 
policy goals,” in light of the international environment.217 Consensus is “the amount of 
domestic political agreement regarding the ends and means of foreign policy change.”218  
The internal predispositions of Germany's public and political elites determined both the 
compatibility of their views with the international context and the consensus needed to 
act. 
The interests, values and norms that guided German foreign policy changed 
because they were incompatible with the international environment and were not backed 
by public consensus. Faced with the Bosnian war, the subjective and often unquestioned 
assumptions about the political world that had guided German foreign policy for decades 
were transformed in an agonizing process to fit the new international environment. 
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V. UNITED STATES SECURITY CULTURE 
A. U.S. HISTORY, FOREIGN AND MILITARY POLICY DISPOSITIONS 
This section examines the sources and development of the security culture of the 
United States of America, emphasizing the rationale for U.S. cultural preferences and 
explaining the cultural predispositions of the American public and political elites. The 
chapter will, despite the preceding chapter on German security culture, put more 
emphasize on the examination of military culture, since security and military culture are 
more closely related in the U.S. than in Germany and influence each other. 
Both history and geography shape the national security culture of the United 
States.219 Isolated with relatively weak neighbors on the American continent, shielded by 
the Atlantic and Pacific oceans from the Eurasian landmass, the U.S. has a form of free 
security. This security free ride insulated America from the destruction of the European 
wars. Nor did the U.S. exhaust itself by waging wars against its neighbors like the 
European powers. Long periods of peace on its own territory punctuated by conflicts like 
the civil war and the two world wars shaped America's national security culture. Those 
conflicts are seen as crusades of good versus evil.220 American security culture rejected 
the European tradition of power politics based on the dynastic absolutist model and the 
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power-balancing alliance politics of Bismarck.221 Americans “felt both separate from—
indeed, superior to—a Europe perceived as corrupt, effete, maybe downright 
degenerate.”222 Moreover, wars were fought outside American territory with relative 
ease,223 specifically when compared with European powers.   
The free security realm affects American perception of the world and other 
states.224 The U.S. does not perceive itself as a nation among others “with whom it must 
deal as rivals, as allies, as partners.”225  Imitating their British progenitors, Americans for 
a long time identified themselves as an exceptional society with a particular obligation to 
better the lot of humanity.226 The U.S. understood aggression like the European wars as 
rebellion against the eternal and universal principles of world society. Therefore the 
dominant impulse of U.S. foreign policy was to diffuse its liberal democratic ideals, 
linking closely democracy and peace. American idealism, associated with the “American 
way of life,” is a core-element of its national identity that considers the U.S. as a model 
for others. Idealism proposes that all countries should live together in peace, justice and 
wealth. This so-called one world concept based on a liberal democratic world order was 
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advocated by the U.S. throughout its history.227 Creating a world order and secure 
international environment to enhance the nation’s economic well-being and promote U.S. 
goods abroad is in America's national interest.228 Thus, idealism, and specifically the 
promotion of American values and the free market system abroad, happily coincides with 
America’s national interests. 
But American idealism has its limits and critics.229 With its unique willingness to 
engage in warfare, the U.S. tends to rely on and emphasize the efficacy of military force, 
often as some scholars controversially argue, without a majority of the public 
agreeing.230 As with the two world wars, Americans prefer wars with definitive 
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results.231 Since 1945, U.S. military leaders have been uncomfortable with the conduct of 
war for limited political aims. In Korea and Vietnam, the military leadership did not like 
anything short of total victory.232 The American Way of War by Weigley describes the 
distinct American military culture that favors wars of annihilation through the extensive 
use of firepower.233 Other ways of conducting war have been manifested in American 
military culture, including deterrence and wars for limited aims.234 Overall, however, the 
American way of fighting wars is the “quest for swift victory through the hazards of 
decisive battle rather than [a] slower approach.”235 Americans seem to prefer “neat 
categories of right and wrong, and clear indications of national interest;” and they dislike 
limited liability.236 
To achieve fast and decisive victories, U.S. military strategy relies strongly on 
technology. The apocalyptical warfare during the air war against Japan was made 
possible by military leaders and technicians' “technological fanaticism.”237 Throughout 
the Cold War, the United States sought to use its qualitative advantage to counterbalance the 
numerical conventional superiority of the Soviet Union. President John F. Kennedy 
announced the doctrine of “flexible response,” a concept of controlled use of force 
appropriate to specific conditions. Response to attacks would be “'suitable, selective’ as well 
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as ‘swift and effective.’”238 The Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) under the Reagan 
Administration is an example of techno-centric warfare. Conversely, the nuclear arsenal of 
the U.S. creates the notion of a sharp dichotomy between war and peace. Throughout the 
Cold War, nuclear weapons have been predominantly perceived as a means of deterrence in 
Europe and to a lesser extent as means of limited nuclear war fighting for the U.S. 
Nevertheless, the destructiveness of nuclear weapons makes them unsuitable “as an 
instrument for the achievement of any coherent political purpose.”239 Nuclear weapons are 
perceived as politically, militarily, and psychologically different; their use is perceived as 
taboo.240 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the prospect of nuclear war faded. As the only 
remaining superpower, and with the worldwide reduction of military budgets, America's 
technological advantage increased. Post-Cold War conflicts like the war in the former 
Yugoslavia highlighted the technological rift. But U.S. military technological superiority can 
be both functional and dysfunctional.241 With the advent of the new world order, the U.S. 
embraced the “new American way of war” or the so called revolution in military affairs 
based on extremely low cost, low risk military intervention.242 Washington was able to “pick 
and choose” among conflicts and crises according to its interest.243  
America's traditional reliance on military technology was not always a means for 
success. Despite large scale industrialized air offensives against North Vietnam, that war did 
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Brookings Institution, 1995), 397. 
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not end with American victory even though the U.S. did not lose a single battle in the 
Vietnam campaign and its technological power remained potent throughout the war.244 The 
declared strategy in Vietnam failed to bring success, especially in counter insurgency. The 
issue duration caused by the new strategy, including losses of U.S. soldiers, turned the public 
against the war. By 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson and Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara knew the war could not be won. The military, and specifically General 
MacArthur, felt that the war was lost by a "stab in the back."245 In fact, Vietnam was 
perceived as a debacle for the U.S. It had lasting ramifications on the American way of war—
causing the “Vietnam syndrome.” As an outgrowth of the collective lesson of Vietnam and 
subsequent conflicts, the Weinberger doctrine promulgated a list of conditions for the U.S. 
commitment of troops.246  
Modern day casualty aversion in U.S. security culture, partly caused by the Vietnam 
debacle, is deeply rooted in the public and elite's psyche. The coffins of American soldiers, 
amid the strategic pointlessness of Johnson and Nixon's strategies, “eroded U.S. domestic 
support for the war in the mid- to late-1960s.”247 Military leaders and politicians, more than 
the public, feel the sensitivity to casualties in war. The responsibility elites feel for the public 
weigh heavily when they send the army of the American people into war.248 Junior officers 
and the public “appear to be more prepared to accept risk, provided the mission serves some 
purpose.”249 The political fallout of the Vietnam conflict left its mark on all subsequent 
administrations. 
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After the Cold War, the sustaining of casualties further declined.250 The U.S. public 
and elites became increasingly sensitive to losses.251 The wider public longed for the peace 
dividend in the wake of the 1990-91 war, while fussy elites assumed that no strategic purpose 
could possibly justify the spilling of blood. This fact accounts for America's refusal to take up 
arms in southeast Europe and to deploy ground troops in humanitarian interventions. In the 
1990s, the U.S. government enhanced the standoff capability of its forces to increase their 
ability to use force without suffering casualties. Since the early 1920s, the air force could use 
force effectively without the risk of losing soldiers. 
In sum, Americans are more likely than Germans to use military force to pursue 
national interests and political goals. The U.S. technological advantage makes warfare 
acceptable to many because it minimizes casualties, but a deeply rooted aversion to casualties 
makes the U.S. reluctant to deploy ground forces. 
After World War II, the U.S. could no longer enjoy its security free ride. 
American security culture shifted from the territorial boundaries on the continent toward 
global influence and security interests. The U.S. developed a new national security 
ideology and foreign policy based on the perception of the post-war world and America’s 
place within it.252 The intent to withdraw U.S. troops from Europe after the defeat of 
Nazi Germany was soon abandoned with the shift to the new national security ideology. 
Given the perceived unprecedented Soviet ideological and military threat, the U.S. 
military could not “simply pack its bags and go home before organizing the West.”253 
The new ideology demanded a permanent program of preparedness and vigilance, and 
facing the Communist threat.254 It made clear that freedom and peace are indivisible.255 
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Thus, through extended deterrence the West European countries became the outposts of 
America’s national defense to “provide for the common defense” and “obtain the 
blessings of liberty.”256 To reconstruct war-shattered Europe, the U.S. developed several 
plans to rebuild western Europe–economically through the Marshall Plan, militarily 
through NATO–as an outer line of defense and to roll back the Communist threat.257  
During the Cold War, different administrations and the American public defined 
U.S. interests worldwide. They believed that American security must not be defended at 
the U.S. coastlines, but in Berlin and Taipei.258 To inhibit communism, George F. 
Kennan introduced the concept of containment, which used American power to react to 
Soviet expansionism worldwide.259 America became the protector and provider “of all 
those they deemed threatened by a communist takeover”260 and the hegemon within 
NATO.261 
In order to pursue its global interests and security needs, the U.S. acceded to 
multiple international organizations. The end of World War II was the beginning of the 
transatlantic link between Western Europe and the U.S. in security affairs; multiple 
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security institutions under American leadership were created worldwide.262 The United 
States and Great Britain, at that time the strongest advocates for an international system 
based on international law, were at the lead in creating the United Nations and the legal 
order surrounding it.263 Following the dramatic post-war events in Europe, the necessity 
of a defensive alliance became evident.264 After much hesitation, even the U.S., “with its 
historical antipathy to alliances,” accepted the establishment of NATO and its Art. 5 
collective defense clause.265 The Washington Treaty in 1949 was based on the principles 
of the UN Charter. NATO has been perceived as an anchor for security both in Europe 
and the U.S. Throughout the Cold War, “U.S. leadership had been exercised primarily 
through NATO."266 That said, proposals by the U.S. would be supported or opposed by 
the allies. Most importantly, the allies could be sure of the lead and substantive expertise 
of alliance operations.267 
The Korean war became the first manifestation of alliance cooperation in crisis. 
Since the U.S. saw Europe as its main area of interest and its “outpost of [U.S.] national 
defense” it refrained from escalating the war into China and shifted its foreign policy 
towards the European interests.268 The Korean war proved that the U.S. political leaders, 
including Truman, Acheson, Eisenhower and Dulles, believed strongly in the European 
allies and the necessity of the Transatlantic Alliance.269 The Suez Crisis of 1956 was 
perceived as another cornerstone of alliance (non-)cooperation. The U.S. felt deceived by 
its allies' failure to conform to the “fundamental collective understandings constituting 
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the transatlantic community—‘trust and confidence.’”270 The Suez crisis proved that 
multilateral conformity benefits the international actor and more important, that the U.S. 
is willing and able to act unilaterally with “coercive behavior” against its allies.271  
The importance of organizational structure and multilateralism in international 
organizations decreased in U.S. foreign policy in the 1980s, changing how the U.S. enters 
and conducts wars.272 However, U.S. participation in international organizations like the 
UN and NATO and cultural, financial, and economic globalization prevents a complete 
resumption of the isolatist tradition of American foreign and security policy. Moreover, 
U.S. administrations have not favored complete decoupling. The strategic concept of 
forward defense was jettisoned at the end of the Cold War, and the U.S. would “not be 
able to maintain the same level of commitments in Europe as it had in the past.”273 The 
Bush administration’s foreign policy toward Europe saw the U.S. as leading through 
NATO, with the Europeans bearing a greater share of the security burden.  
In summary, the U.S. has adjusted its position in the post-Cold War world.274 
America's security culture prior the Balkan wars consisted of three predispositions that 
informed the use of force: technological fetishism and casualty aversion, and  multilateral 
conformity and legitimacy.275  
B. U.S. PREDISPOSITIONS AND EARLY PERCEPTION OF THE WAR 
Because the impact of the changed international environment prior the outbreak 
of the Bosnian war on U.S. security culture can not be neglected, this section guides the 
reader through the early Balkan wars, examines Washington’s perception of the Bosnian 
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war, and analyzes the impact of the war on U.S. predispositions. A certain amount of 
overlap in the subsequent discussion cannot be avoided because the relevant 
predispositions of U.S. public and political elites are closely interrelated.  
America's technological fetishism, decisive warfare and casualty aversion are 
responsible for the perception of the Balkan wars, along with its orientation toward the 
new world order, absorption with events after 1989, multilateralism, and the relationship 
with the Yugoslav state. 
1. Predispositions and Perceptions Caused by U.S. Domestic Policy 
Within a month after the Cold War ended, the Bush administration was focused 
on how to encourage the peaceful revolution in Central and Eastern Europe. The end of 
the U.S.-Soviet rivalry that dominated global politics for nearly half a century “presented 
[Washington] with both a challenge and an opportunity.”276 The opportunity was to 
shape a new world order which underlined the “validity of the principles which had 
sustained U.S. foreign policy for the previous forty years.”277 The new world order 
created a swell of optimism in the U.S.278 But it also caused fierce debate and criticism of 
Bush.279 Washington was overwhelmed by the ramifications of the Soviet collapse and 
its foreign policy could hardly keep pace with the international and diplomatic revolution. 
The new U.S. role was still being identified at the outbreak of the Balkan wars. 
Contributing to the instability and uncertainty was the issue density of different events 
which drew America’s attention, such as the Gulf crisis and the Yugoslav war of 
dissolution. 
The universality of values reflecting American idealism remained intact, which 
became evident from the support for German reunification and the operation in 
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Kuwait.280 But the Balkan wars proved that idealism had its limits. Although the 
outbreak of the Balkan wars threatened the values of the new world order, America's 
“vital interests were not immediately at stake.”281 
The Bush administration was aware of the emerging crisis in Yugoslavia.282 The 
American ambassador in Belgrade, Warren Zimmermann, warned the administration in 
1990 that the dissolution of the Yugoslav state was a possibility because of the 
unwillingness to compromise in Yugoslav politics.283 Secretary of State James Baker 
voiced deep concerns after his visit in Belgrade in June 1991. Although Belgrade never 
got U.S. approval to keep the Yugoslav integrity, Baker insisted during his visit that “the 
United States continues to recognize and support the territorial integrity of 
Yugoslavia.”284 Nevertheless, on his return to Washington, Baker was more than glad to 
withdraw from the Yugoslav turmoil. He felt burned by his visit to Belgrade, a city he 
perceived as a can of worms that the U.S. should avoid.285 However, Congress began to 
press hard for a stronger U.S. involvement. The increasingly emotional political discourse 
played a role here, stirred up by media reporting on the ground. Senator Robert Dole 
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argued before the Senate that “the United States urgently needs to review its policy 
toward Yugoslavia” and the United States should “get off the sidelines. We cannot be 
spectators.”286 
The lessons of Vietnam were raised in the political discourse concerning the 
Persian Gulf and Bosnia.287 Intervention in the Balkan wars would have led the U.S. 
government down a path to a nebulous outcome in terms of military casualties and 
financial investments. The complexity and intensity of the Balkan wars denied a clearly 
predictable American victory. Unlike the Persian Gulf, where clear skies and desert 
terrain favored decisive U.S. operations, the Balkans are cloudy, mountainous and 
heavily forested.288 Front lines where U.S. technological superiority would be 
advantageous were not clearly identified. Still, in 1992 the President stated that he did not 
want to be involved in guerilla warfare in Yugoslavia because the U.S. had “lived 
through that once already.”289 Military commanders, with their deeply rooted casualty 
aversion, recommended that American troops not be involved in the Yugoslav war. They 
interpreted the conflict as insoluble, whatever the international interventions.290 In sum, 
political and military elites perceived that any intervention in the Balkan wars could not 
end swiftly with a decisive battle and thus would cause American casualties. The 
Vietnam syndrome was revived. 
Also, America and Yugoslavia were perceived to be divided by a cultural 
distance. Kennan, a former ambassador to Yugoslavia, described its population as a non-
European civilization with non-European characteristics.291 Americans saw the Muslim 
population in Bosnia as “others.” This was reinforced by the growing perception that 
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Muslims threaten the U.S. and the “assumption that Islam is essentially inconsistent with 
democracy” and therefore incompatible with American values.292 That said crisis 
prevention in Yugoslavia in order to diffuse democratic norms would not be at all 
fruitful. The U.S. initially perceived the Balkan wars as a mix of “aggression, ethnic 
assertion, self-determination and state preservation."293 The hypothesis that “atrocity is 
natural to the Balkans” added to American assumptions that distant cultures are more 
prone to violent behavior.294 Much-read among the Bush Administration was the book 
“Balkan Ghosts” by Robert D. Kaplan, which saw the wars caused by deep-rooted 
“ancient hatreds” that could hardly be stopped.295 The possibility that these wars might 
have been stirred up by ethnic entrepreneurs was in these days still hardly discussed. 
Americans saw the outbreak of violence in distant cultures as unfortunate but 
unavoidable “and beyond America’s ability to alleviate.”296 Internationalist foreign 
policy and support for state building based on the one world concept as a feature of 
security culture were thus seen as impractical. 
Overall, the distinct cultural features of casualty aversion and the emphasis on 
decisive short battles based on technological advantage biased Washington against 
forceful early intervention in the Balkan wars. The cultural distance to Yugoslavia 
outweighed American idealist notions of state building and the spread of democracy. 
Contributing to those predispositions is the fact that American interests during the 
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2. Predispositions and Perceptions Caused by the International 
Environment 
The end of the Cold War struck the United States like a tidal wave.297 The State 
Department stopped referring to the Soviet Union as an enemy in 1989 with the Bush 
administration's development of a coherent policy towards the Soviet Union and the 
Central Eastern European (CEE) states.298 Transformation of the U.S.-Soviet relationship 
was the main focus of American foreign policy and issues concerning Yugoslavia could 
not be isolated from the relationship. The new world order called for the quick 
development of new foreign policy doctrines and the reorientation of the responsibilities 
of the last remaining superpower. The cultural dimension of conflict in the Balkans 
revitalized Russian interest in the Slavic Serbs and directly affected the U.S.-Russian 
relationship. German reunification was another central issue.299 The U.S. and the 
Russians were the strongest and most influential proponents on the German question. 
German reunification was seen as an integral part of the new world order. The Balkan 
wars with its refugee problems were perceived as a threat to the new European order.  
International organizations provided the primary guidelines for U.S. foreign 
policy at the outbreak of the Balkan wars because American interests were not much at 
stake. The U.S. tends to react unilaterally and forcefully when it cares about a problem 
but is otherwise willing to rely on others.300 Thus, American predispositions at the outset 
of the war have to be viewed through the lens of international organizations. 
The Balkan wars presented the U.S. with the problem of maintaining the principle 
of multilateralism and most importantly, “the unity of the Atlantic Allies.”301 Unlike the 
Gulf war, in which European allies relied on American military and political capabilities, 
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the Balkan wars were seen as a European crisis that could be resolved without U.S. 
support. European hubris drove the U.S. away from the Balkan crisis, which was 
somewhat welcomed by Washington. Significant restraints in handling the crisis resulted 
from the tensions between the U.S. and the Europeans. 
The development of a European security identity in 1990 would have fit perfectly 
into the Cold War structure of NATO.302 Yet, after the Cold War, the U.S. perceived the 
drive for a European security identity outside of NATO and the Eurocorps, a 
multinational formation developed by France and Germany, as threats. With the Soviet 
threat vanished, the Bush administration favored strengthening the European pillar in 
order to reduce its European obligations. But the preferred forum to do this was 
NATO.303 The U.S., however, knew that when they share a burden, allies want more of a 
say in decision-making.304 Thus, U.S. multilateralism was challenged and torn between 
contradictory aims.  
The problem was that several Europeans, especially France and increasingly 
Germany, preferred the Western European Union (WEU) to strengthen the European 
capacity to act. but as part of the WEU, Europeans could “seek to distance themselves 
from American leadership and undermine NATO.”305 The French vision of a more 
autonomous Europe based on the WEU caused severe friction between NATO members. 
The agreement on the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within NATO and 
the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs) in 1994 was a compromise, after the 
EU had started to formulate its own Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) in 
Maastricht in 1991 already.306 This inevitably imposed on the unwilling Americans both 
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“a far more ‘European’ alliance than had previously existed”307 and the perspective of a 
separate European defense pillar outside NATO.  
This was the background for U.S. early action when the breakdown of Yugoslavia 
occurred. On the one hand, the Bush administration favored a hands-off policy, 
perceiving this as a European affair. On the other hand, it feared to loose too much 
control. Thus, once the fighting started in Slovenia and then Croatia, the Bush 
administration responded with concern about both the option of recognition and the 
leading role of the Europeans.308 It was irritated by the new European assertiveness and 
realized how little it could now influence the European recognition debate, which ran 
counter to U.S. preferences. The Balkan wars thus tested the American principles of 
multilateralism and burden sharing.309 
The success of the operation to liberate Kuwait “cast a shadow over subsequent 
U.S. policy on Yugoslavia.”310 The Persian Gulf crisis of 1990-91 created an opportunity 
for the U.S. to reorient its foreign policy.311 Iraq's invasion of Kuwait helped clarify the 
U.S. government’s view of its role in the international order. The Gulf war was seen as 
the model for the new world order. Domestically, the U.S. operation received heavy 
criticism.312 The success of the U.S. operation gave Bush substantial support in the 
elections, but the war also exhausted Washington.313 Presidential advisors were reluctant 
to endanger the likely electoral success by involvement in the Balkans, where no U.S. 
interests seemed to be at stake.314 The Gulf war exemplifies clearly defined perceptions 
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of good and evil, unambiguous moral choices and clearly identified American 
interests.315 The perception of the Bosnian war was exactly the opposite. 
Yugoslavia had a special relationship with the West motivated by the geostrategic 
and political rationale directly connected to the Truman doctrine that Soviet client states 
that follow the Yugoslav example of splitting from the Soviet Union would receive 
political and financial support.316 The U.S. firmly supported the unity, territorial 
integrity, and independence of Yugoslavia and later the initial transition to democracy 
and a free market.317 Its privileged position gave Yugoslavia a free ride until 1991 with 
regards to its human rights record.318 With support from the U.S., the EC became 
Yugoslavia's main partner.319 At the end of the Cold War, Washington saw the Balkans 
as lying outside the U.S. "sphere of interest."320 
Principled idealism and isolationism were the traditional U.S. foreign policy 
impulses early in the conflict.321 But the U.S. still tried diplomatically to prod the 
Europeans into stronger action and later returned to a multilateral initiative as a way of 
spreading responsibility. In July 1991, the administration warned in a NATO meeting in 
Brussels that Milosevic “needed to be stopped if a bloody break-up of Yugoslavia was to 
be avoided.”322 Europeans in NATO, especially Great Britain and France, replied that the 
events in Yugoslavia should not be over dramatized. On a CSCE meeting on minority 
rights in July 1991, the U.S. delegation was “frustrated about the unwillingness of the 
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Europeans even to mention internal affairs, particularly human rights abuses.”323 In 
November 1991 at the NATO summit in Rome, the U.S. put heavy pressure on the 
Europeans and emphasized that “attempts to change existing borders through the use of 
force or a policy of fait accompli are unacceptable.”324 But Washington accepted the lead 
of the European Community mediating the early conflict. One consequence was that it 
also had to accept the EC fait accompli of recognizing Croatia and Slovenia in early 
1992, which undercut U.S. foreign policy goals and was highly criticized.325 Washington 
later had to follow the Europeans and recognize the secessionist states. 
In sum, the international environment, including multilateral obligations, rules 
and norms imposed by international organizations had an obvious effect on U.S. foreign 
policy. The U.S. lent its support to international organizations because vital American 
interests seemed not to be at stake. Washington wanted the Europeans to take most of this 
burden. The U.S. was predisposed to act with caution and avoid upsetting Russia, whose 
transformation was Washington’s main concern.  
C. THE IMPACT OF THE BOSNIAN WAR 
This section guides the reader through the Bosnian war. It links aspects of the 
war, as the independent variable, with culture bearing units in the U.S., representing the 
security culture; it analyzes public opinion and political discourse. This section is divided 
into three subsections. The first explains the transmittance of the Bosnian war to America 
and the importance of means of communication. The following two subsections examine 
the change of U.S. foreign policy towards Bosnia. They will demonstrate a change in the 
rating of cultural preferences and analyze the repercussions during the later years of the 
war. 
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Because Yugoslavia was outside Washington's sphere of interest, America reacted 
slowly to the war.  Clinton's election in 1993 did not immediately change policy toward 
Bosnia, although Clinton's rhetoric in the campaign was quite interventionist. American 
foreign policy involved multilateral operations that constrained their operations in 
Yugoslavia. Washington was busy preventing the conflict from spilling over to 
neighboring countries, delivering humanitarian aid to Bosnian minorities, and putting 
increasing economic and diplomatic pressure on Serbia. The continued ineffectiveness of 
UN and European mediation forced the Clinton administration to take action. Washington 
finally intervened in the conflict because the credibility of NATO and the U.S. both were 
at stake; but the change of U.S. foreign policy was caused by a reorientation of America's 
own interests. The international deadlock in Bosnia plus increasing domestic pressure 
made a new political course of action possible in the summer of 1995. The insight grew 
that America was still more needed than expected in Europe, that NATO was gliding into 
a serious identity crisis without going “out-of-area”. The U.S. had to remain an active 
player in Europe and world affairs. Thus, American foreign policy changed to actively 
assume responsibility for resolving the conflict, a change that finally resulted in the 
contribution of 20,000 U.S. troops to keep the peace after the Dayton agreement. 
1. The Role of the Media in the U.S. 
The United States is a paradise for media and the press. As Biagi notes, “[I]n no 
other country do the mass media capture so much of people’s time and attention.”326 
Washington, D.C. is home to the White House, the cabinet departments, and Congress 
along with other places where newsworthy information is made public every day.327 
Endless briefings, statements and hearings with images and international news are made 
public through the media. The media was a decisive causal link between the Bosnian war 
and U.S. foreign policy. The “relentless coverage" of inhumane acts, the siege of 
Sarajevo, and Bosnian war victims were linked to a variety of U.S. policy responses and 
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“reflect causation rather than coincidence.”328 Most reporters lived in Sarajevo, as did the 
war’s most frequent victims. Their articles and broadcasts “influenced public opinion and 
fed the moral exasperation among academics, legislatures, and senior policymakers.”329 
During the hostage crisis in May 1995, the world’s press was invited by the Bosnian 
Serbs to film “human shields” handcuffed to trees and telephone poles. The world saw 
broadcasts of miserably humiliated UN peace keepers and French soldiers waving white 
flags.330 Those pictures did not deter the American public, but rather provoked support 
for the UN to “get tougher.” 
One-time Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Thomas "Tip" O’Neill 
famously claimed that “all politics is local.” He meant that politicians working on a 
global stage are influenced by their electorate.331 In fact, public opinion is an important 
element in American security policy decisions. Some scholars even believe that “opinion 
polls are at the core of presidential decision making.”332 Others argue that when 
presidents “go public” they can garner support to convince fellow politicians and 
Congress.333 Hence, public opinion becomes a political tool. For this reason, American 
politicians pay close attention to opinion polls both as a tool and to manipulate political 
goals. American administrations hype the threats of the belligerents when going to war. 
In Operation Desert Shield in Kuwait, the Bush administration became very concerned 
about public opinion.334 When the media showed pictures of American hostages held in 
Iraq, Bush gave the hostage issue and Iraq's alleged nuclear weapons program greater 
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prominence to gain public support and justify the use of force. Normally there is broad 
public support when the President initiates military action.335 The public “rallies 'round 
the flag” when national interests are at stake and military action pursues coherent goals. 
The images of the Bosnian war atrocities had mixed impact because the American 
public generally supports one out of four basic standpoints on foreign policy.336 
American perception of the war was therefore fractured. In addition, the U.S. media is 
often “systematically selective in reporting international events”337 or manipulates 
material to favor some groups. The American public lacks knowledge of international 
affairs and is thus vulnerable to manipulation. However, a Gallup opinion poll in May 
1993 found that about 70 percent of Americans followed the events in Bosnia at least 
fairly closely.338 
In America, the impact of the media on the public sphere was not as strong as in 
Germany.  Because other issues absorbed American attention and the media, such as the 
relationship and the transformation in Russia and the Gulf war, Somalia, and Haiti, 
Yugoslavia was “simply not on the screen.”339 
2. The Impact of the Bosnian war 
American engagement in the Bosnian war was conspicuously lacking. The U.S. 
did not participate in the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, hardly paid 
attention to it and later sidelined it. It did not participate in UNPROFOR. During the first 
three years, Washington rejected any use of U.S. and NATO forces other than for air 
strikes and embargo operations which proved to be relatively inefficient. The Bush and 
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Clinton administrations effectively left it up to the Europeans to determine Western 
policy.340 The U.S. policy towards the Bosnian war can be best described as fluctuating 
between the rhetoric about responsibility and reluctance to back those words with 
military force. In August 1995, the Clinton administration changed course, as taking the 
lead seemed less risky than other courses of action. American containment and 
disengagement policy ended with recognition of the fact that engagement was 
unavoidable.341 
a. The Hesitant Superpower 
At the start of the Bosnian war in April 1992, the Bush administration was 
passive, hoping that the UN and Europeans could stop the fighting. Following Europe's 
diplomatic lead and anticipating EC support, the U.S. advocated expelling Yugoslavia 
from international organizations, withdrawing the ambassadors and closing American 
airports to the Yugoslav national airline.342  
In August, the media began reporting the humanitarian nightmare. Pictures 
of the atrocities, criticisms of candidate Clinton, the support of various influential 
politicians and interest groups, specifically American Jewish elites and the diasporas, 
forced the administration to react.343 Bush made the Bosnian war “zur Chefsache” (a 
Presidential concern) to avert the impression that Bosnia was not a political focus.344 
Although initially reluctant, Bush eventually proposed using air power to enforce a UN 
Security Council resolution to safeguard humanitarian flights to Sarajevo.345 Public 
opinion supported using U.S. forces in UN humanitarian relief efforts. In December 
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1992, the Gallup organization found that 57 percent of Americans favored the use of U.S. 
aircraft, while 36 percent rejected it. In February 1993, 68 percent favored participation, 
and only 29 percent opposed it.346 
Secretary of State Baker addressed the humanitarian nightmare but 
claimed that there will be no American use of force.347 The Bush administration and 
military leadership feared a protracted conflict with an unclear outcome and American 
casualties.348  The President worried that the failure of an American campaign would 
lead to “calls for the commitment of substantial allied ground forces.”349 In a 
Congressional hearing the Assistant Secretary of State for European and Canadian 
Affairs, Thomas Niles drew an indirect reference to the Vietnam war in the minds of 
military authorities.350 
The humanitarian situation deteriorated in the winter months. In October 
1992, the U.S. threatened to use airpower to enforce the UN no-fly zone over Bosnia. 
Almost 63 percent of Americans favored the deployment of U.S. aircraft, while 29 
percent disagreed. As during most of the Bosnian war, the public was more willing to 
employ force and act strongly than the Administration. However, the military leadership 
refused deployment due to the ill-defined use of force. General Colin Powell was quoted 
as saying, “decisive means and results are always to be preferred, even if not always 
possible.”351 In fact, the U.S. Air Force was strongly restricted in how to enforce the no-
fly zone. Any use of force had to be multilateral, first authorized by the UN Headquarters 
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in New York, and exerted only for humanitarian purposes, not to resolve the underlying 
political problem – a procedure that drew rising criticism and caused deep frustration in 
Washington.352 The Bush administration thus in late 1992 followed three main 
principles: no ground forces, military involvement for humanitarian relief only, and the 
primacy of the UN and the Europeans. Those principles were heavily criticized 
domestically. 
The Bosnian war was seen as involving a vital American interest only if 
the war spilled into other regions.353 This position had broad support. In early 1993, only 
15 percent of the public thought that national security was a good reason for military 
intervention in Bosnia; only 16 percent felt that U.S. interests were at stake. The largest 
reason cited for intervention (37 percent) was to stop ethnic cleansing.354 
Bush was clearly influenced by candidate Clinton's foreign policy 
critique.355 As a campaigner free of policy making responsibility, Clinton supported air 
strikes and urged military support, strong rhetoric that led Americans to think that foreign 
policy would change if he won office.356 The public urged the government to take a more 
active role in the Bosnian war.357 In an attempt to safeguard the election, Bush 
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announced in a West Point speech in January 1993 that “the United States should not 
seek to be the world’s policeman," adding that "in the wake of the Cold War, it is the role 
of the United States to marshal its moral and material resources to promote a democratic 
peace. It is our responsibility – it is our opportunity – to lead. There is no one else.”358 
In the spring, international efforts focused on the Vance-Owen Plan. The 
U.S. thought that diplomatic options had eroded after a Bosnian Serb attack on 
Srebrenica on March 18.359 After further Serb aggression, the U.S. pushed through 
monitoring of the no-fly zone with Operation Deny Flight, the start of NATO 
involvement. The Clinton administration opted for an even stronger NATO commitment 
in a “lift and strike” strategy in May 1993. “Lift and strike” meant lifting the arms 
embargo on Bosnia and using U.S. and NATO air strikes to attack Serb strongholds. At 
the opening of the Holocaust Museum in late April, Clinton was deeply impressed by 
Elie Wiesel's comparison of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia with the Holocaust. In talks with 
Polish and Czech political leaders, Clinton saw NATO's future threatened by the Bosnian 
war. Lech Walesa and Vaclav Havel argued that their states were in a vacuum since the 
Soviet collapse; they wanted to join NATO and needed U.S. support.  
Washington’s reluctance to deal with the Bosnian war was contrary to the hopes of the 
CEE governments. These considerations led Clinton to accept the “lift and strike” 
strategy. 360  
An April poll found that 62 percent of Americans would oppose and only 
30 percent would favor unilateral U.S. air strikes against Serb strongholds. A month later, 
the public favored the strikes.361 Support for a multilateral effort was at 59 percent.362 
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When the option of intervention with ground troops was described as a unilateral 
American action, public support averaged 43 percent, but multilateral action garnered 60 
percent support.363 
Secretary of State Warren Christopher could not persuade the European 
allies to back the “lift and strike” strategy.364 The Europeans would only accept to the 
“lift and strike” strategy in the Bosnian question with more pressure and a definite 
commitment of Washington.365 Europe feared that U.S. unilateral actions like those taken 
in the Suez crisis would damage the Alliance; furthermore they feared an increasing 
influx of weapons into the region with lifting the arms embargo and thus saw the security 
of their own troops in UNPROFOR at stake. On the other hand, Washington was 
unwilling to lead international crisis management.366 Thus Clinton dropped the “lift and 
strike” idea and returned to diplomatic placebos. 
Washington adopted the European idea of containment, defending six 
Muslim enclaves that had been declared safe areas by the UN.367 Allied requests for 
troops for Bosnia were neglected by Clinton.368 In May 1993, he promised financial 
support for the Arms Export Control Act to enforce sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro, and for humanitarian aid to Bosnian and Croatian refugees. Clinton changed 
his rhetoric and emphasized that financial support served America's national security 
interest.369  
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In July, the deteriorating humanitarian situation again made headlines. 
After feverish discussion, the administration again pushed for “air power in the service of 
diplomacy.”370 This time Washington threatened to proceed unilaterally and the 
European allies voiced support, although they forced compromises that resulted in the 
infamous “dual-key” arrangement, which so much undermined NATO/US-UN 
relations.371 In October 1993, President Clinton first said that the U.S. had "significant 
interests" in resolving the Bosnian conflict, a statement that led to a heated debate in 
Congress.372 The majority of Congress opposed the deployment of ground forces. 
Military leaders were concerned about the troop deployment and argued that the complex 
Bosnian war was not comparable with the war in Iraq.373 Gallup in May found that 68 
percent of Americans favored deployment of U.S. troops to achieve peace in Bosnia.374 
In October, with the unfolding of the crisis in Somalia, Clinton became more aware of 
risk, and public support for sending troops to Bosnia dropped to 40 percent.375 
Overall, public support for unilateral American action was weak, but 
multilateral efforts got stronger support. A growing consensus within political elites and 
the public called for something to be done. Opinion polls revealed steadily increasing 
support for multilateral military intervention and the use of force. Instead of acting 
unilaterally, the Clinton Administration preferred NATO entanglement in the war. The 
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American discourse slowly shifted from purely humanitarian considerations to concern 
for U.S.  national security and U.S. interests.376 
b. Engaging Diplomacy 
In January 1994, pressure on the United States increased.377 Madeleine 
Albright, the U.S. Ambassador to the UN, voiced deep concerns about America's Europe 
policy and the credibility of NATO.378 In February, Walter B. Slocombe urged members 
of the U.S. House of Representatives to remain engaged in NATO and to press forward to 
bring peace, prosperity and democracy to the new Europe.379 The necessity for U.S. 
leadership was made manifest by political elites. 
The artillery shelling of the Sarajevo marketplace on February 5 
unexpectedly catalyzed U.S. policy. Broadcasted images of the 68 dead and 200 wounded 
civilians caused widespread aversion in America. In the wake of the attack, NATO 
imposed a strict ultimatum on the Bosnian Serbs to lift the siege and backed it with a 
threat of air strikes.380 Sixty-five percent of Americans favored air strikes.381 The same 
poll revealed that 32 percent saw involvement in the Bosnian war as in the U.S. interest, 
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while 59 percent claimed there were other reasons to get involved. After the Sarajevo 
bombing, even support for the deployment of combat troops went up.382 
The diplomatic initiative by Clinton and the Germans, the Washington 
Agreement, brokered a peace between the Bosnian and Croat forces, reducing the 
belligerents to two.383 Additionally, the U.S. and Russia found a compromise to deal with 
the Krajina region at Zagreb.384 The Clinton administration's diplomatic offensives were 
the first successful initiatives in the Bosnian war, although the initiative was counter to 
the efforts of the ICFY, because the belligerents hoped to gain more from direct contact 
with America. 
In April 1994, the Contact Group was formed as the main forum of the 
external parties, partly because the U.S. resisted working with David Owen and Thorvald 
Stoltenberg, the joint Chairmen of the ICFY.385 Instead of a multilateral approach with 
all twelve governments of the European Union or the EU Troika, the U.S. wanted close 
dialogue with the members of the UN Security Council, including Germany, but outside 
of New York.386 European and U.S. diplomats were convinced that close cooperation 
was the only practical way to settle the Balkan conflict. Unlike former peace plans, the 
emerging Contact Group plan had a distinct American signature. It was presented to the 
belligerents as a non-negotiable take-it-or-leave-it proposal.387 
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American public opinion in April showed between 76 and 81 percent 
favoring NATO air strikes to stop attacks on Bosnian cities. Almost 73 percent supported 
an American role in a UN peacekeeping force to enforce a peace agreement. Even 
without a peace settlement, almost 66 percent favored contributing to UN peacekeeping 
operations in Bosnia. An overwhelming 90 percent supported UN peacekeepers using 
force to deliver humanitarian aid.388 
Washington tried to persuade its allies once more to accept a “lift and 
strike” strategy. This time, however, Clinton asked for unilateral termination of the arms 
embargo in case the Security Council “fails to pass such a resolution.”389 This raised 
strong concerns among the allies. The Danish Permanent Under Secretary of State for 
Defense, Anders Troldborg, told a Congressional hearing in June that NATO solidarity 
must be maintained, warning of disruption to the alliance if the U.S. tried to lift the arms 
embargo unilaterally.390 
In November 1994, the Republicans, led by Senator Robert Dole, a long-
time advocate for active intervention, captured the Congress.391 Congressional pressure 
and the successful offensive of the Croat troops in May 1994 to re-conquer Western 
Slavonia and Smyrnia, thereby overrunning UNPROFOR, encouraged the Clinton 
administration once more to consider of lifting the arms embargo unilaterally.392 
Moreover, the upcoming election pushed the administration to follow public opinion and 
increase political pressure to end the war. Opinion polls revealed a gradual decline of 
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389 President Clinton’s letter to the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Armed Services on the 
Arms Embargo on Bosnia-Herzegovina: see Vitas and Williams, 254-255. 
390 Permanent Undersecretary of State for Defense, Denmark, Anders Troldborg, Testimony before 
the United States Senate, Committee on Armed Services, June 23, 1994, http://web.lexis-
nexis.com/congcomp/document?_m=e628c39860e9ee22271d7c4fab6bd561&_docnum=2&wchp=dGLbVl
b-zSkSA&_md5=74de5399eac201954e5f2950265fc0d3, accessed 06.May 2007. 
391 Daalder, Getting to Dayton, 31; Larres, 200. 
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sympathy for the Clinton policy.393 Yet, in October 1994, 45 percent of Americans 
believed that vital U.S. interests were at stake in Bosnia. Two-thirds of Americans 
believed that it would be best for the U.S. to take an “active part in world affairs.”394 
Overall, public opinion in 1994 showed a steadily increasing support for 
American involvement in the Bosnian war. Most Americans supported American 
involvement in a multilateral effort to settle the conflict. The willingness to use force in a 
multilateral effort, e.g. air attacks on Serb strongholds, increased enormously. 
c. Exercising Leadership 
In 1995, the Bosnian war took on a new dimension. Newly elected French 
President Jacques Chirac agreed with Washington and favored massive air strikes against 
the Bosnian Serb strongholds. In February, the Security Council asked NATO to plan for 
the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.395 In April, polls showed that the public was frustrated 
with UNPROFOR but only 29 percent of Americans wanted the UN to withdraw from 
Bosnia. The majority favored more forceful UN intervention and the deployment of third-
party military forces.396 On the other hand, the public opposed unilateral circumvention 
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of the arms embargo.397 Washington said it would contribute U.S. forces to protect 
UNPROFOR if they were to withdraw from Bosnia. Even as the U.S. tried to discourage 
UN withdrawal, it “offered the solution to the administration’s predicament.”398 
When UN blue helmets were taken as hostages by the Bosnian Serbs, this 
was the moment of either to withdraw or to upgrade engagement. Great Britain and 
France began to deploy additional ground troops as a Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) to 
support UNPROFOR.399 William J. Perry, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, stating clearly 
that the U.S. would not provide own troops.400 Yet, support to the RRF was broad. In a 
Congressional hearing in mid-June, James Schlesinger concluded his comments with the 
words, “original peace keeping is now over – finished!”401 The UN was more and more 
gliding from peace keeping into peace making. 
After an initial four month cease-fire, fighting in Bosnia erupted with new 
intensity. Americans were once again “confronted with troubling images of 
indiscriminate attacks on civilians and helpless UN peacekeepers.”402 In July, media 
attention focused on the conquests of Srebrenica and Zepa, UN safe havens. Polls showed 
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68 percent of Americans favoring defense of civilians in safe havens.403 The American 
public and elites were overwhelmed by the pictures of the July 6 Srebrenica massacre. 
In the summer of 1995, with a presidential campaign pending, four factors 
pushed the Clinton administration to engage in the Bosnian war and reclaim leadership in 
NATO.404 The four factors were the loss of UN credibility after the Srebrenica massacre, 
the threat to NATO’s legitimacy and thus relevance, the prospect of U.S. troop 
deployment and the Congressional vote to lift the arms embargo. If the U.S. let the 
moment slip away, Clinton claimed, America would be "history."405 Sensing that a policy 
window had opened, he reconsidered Bosnia policy, backed by Madeleine Albright, 
Anthony Lake and after the Srebrenica massacre by William Perry.406 The North Atlantic 
Council (NAC) members called the Bosnian Serb attacks unacceptable and threatened 
NATO use of force. After the European allies agreed to the new strategy, and with 
continuing Serb attacks on safe havens, the NAC decided to use air power. 
The U.S. affirmed its lead role by acknowledging that NATO was 
responsible for the safe withdrawal of UNPROFOR. The U.S., which agreed to deploy 
ground forces to support the withdrawal, insisted that command and control be shifted 
from the UN Secretary General to the United States.407 To facilitate air attacks, the 
Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe (CINCSOUTH) and the Commander UNPF 
signed a memorandum of understanding on the execution of air strikes in August 1995. 
Three weeks later, CINCSOUTH and Commander UNPF decided to launch air strikes in 
Operation Deliberate Force, supported by the U.S. Navy.408 Operation Storm in August, 
the startling Croatian re-conquest of the Krajina, was a blow to the Bosnian Serbs, who 
saw the Croats army now moving forcefully into Northern Bosnia and changing the 
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balance of power on the ground. For NATO, this was an enormous boost, not only 
solving most of the Croat problem before Dayton but also changing the power 
distribution in the Bosnian war in favor of the Bosnian Croat federation and 
demonstrating that the Serbs can indeed be defeated by determined force.409 In 
September, the Bosnian Serbs accepted a peace process which was followed by a cease 
fire in mid-October and negotiations on the Dayton agreement led by U.S. envoy Richard 
Holbrooke. 
Opinion polls in September showed 52 percent of Americans favoring 
deployment of U.S. troops in a peace keeping force, while 43 percent opposed. Polls in 
October revealed that aversion to American casualties remained strong. When the same 
question was posed with a hypothetical 400 U.S. soldiers killed, only 20 percent favored 
a deployment; 72 percent were against it.  Even with only 25 hypothetical American 
casualties, 64 percent of the public said they would oppose deployment.410 However, the 
public perceived the intervention as an operation comparable to the Iraq war rather than a 
Vietnam-style quagmire. Thus in October, public opinion changed to favor deployment. 
Optimism rose as the war came to an end. Almost 80 percent of Americans perceived 
peaceful developments in Bosnia as a U.S. foreign policy goal. Over half—54 percent—
saw U.S. intervention in Bosnia now as a moral obligation to stop atrocities perpetrated 
by the Bosnian Serbs. Forty-two percent supported the reasoning that U.S. leadership in 
the world required the American troop deployment, and 35 percent believed that it was a 
U.S. vital interest to engage in the war.411 
In September 1995, the U.S. Senate adopted an amendment which 
expressed the sense of the Senate on prior approval for deployment of U.S. ground forces 
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in Bosnia and Herzegovina by an overwhelming vote of 94 to 2.412 In a subsequent 
Congressional hearing, Secretary of Defense Perry claimed that  
if a peace agreement is reached, it is essential that the United States and its 
NATO allies, along with our international partners, be prepared to sustain 
that negotiated  peace. As the alliance responsible for peace and 
security in Europe, NATO can do no less. As the leader of NATO, the 
United States must lead and shape this effort—an action necessary to 
protect vital national interests.413 
To summarize, the Clinton administration’s change of course was caused 
by the escalating agony of the war and its appalling humanitarian suffering, by the failure 
of EU and UN to end the war in the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia 
diplomatically and through UNPROFOR on the ground, by the increasing threat to 
NATO’s relevance, by the changing power balance on the ground through the Croat 
offensives, by the prospect of U.S. troop deployment and by the Congressional vote to lift  
the arms embargo. The change was backed by broad support from the general public and 
political elites, support that increased continuously after the Bosnian Serb attacks on safe 
havens. 
3. Pax Americana 
William Perry has said that “history has demonstrated the consequences of 
instability in Europe. If the U.S. does not commit itself in Europe, it will rue the 
consequences for the long term security of Europe and for its own security.”414 The 
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Dayton Peace Accords were a defining moment not only for Bosnia, but in international 
politics.415 The agreement has been called a "Pax Americana,” as the major negotiations 
were conducted by the U.S. delegation under Holbrooke.416  The breakthrough was 
possible because of NATO’s bombing of the Serb strongholds and because of the 
renewed U.S. diplomatic leadership.417 
The NAC authorized the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) to 
deploy an enabling force into Bosnia-Herzegovina on December 1, 1995. The SACEUR 
tasked the CINCSOUTH as Commander for the Implementation Force (IFOR). A few 
days later, Secretary of State Christopher claimed that the President had decided that the 
U.S., as a world leader committed to peace keeping, should "act as the great nation," with 
a concern for both national interests and American ideals.418 Clinton justified the U.S. 
action after the Dayton Agreement as promoting both American values and Washington’s 
interest in a world order with a stable Europe.  With its fragile new democracies adjacent 
to America’s closest allies, “Europe’s freedom and Europe’s stability is vital to 
[America's] own national security.”419 While the Bosnian war did not harm America's 
view of the world order, the promotion of values was a vital interest of the U.S. 420 
Surveys in December found that 71 percent felt strongly about the presence of 
American troops in Bosnia.421 There was also widespread opposition in the U.S. 
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government against a military entanglement.422 IFOR was led by NATO under U.S. 
command, as was the Stabilization Force (SFOR) one year later.423    
D. CONCLUSION 
Comparison of the dispositions of U.S. administrations and American society 
before and after the Bosnian war shows no significant difference. Yet, the Bosnian war 
did challenge the core elements of American security culture: multilateral conformity, 
casualty aversion, and technology fetishism and commitment to decisive war. Distinctive 
cultural features framed the U.S. response to the Bosnian war. The administrations 
gradually moved to align themselves with public opinion; the Bush administration's non-
intervention gave way to humanitarian and eventually military intervention under 
Clinton. 
The element of multilateralism did not change during the Bosnian war. Reliance 
on international organizations, especially NATO, was central to U.S. foreign policy 
throughout the war. The Bush and the Clinton administration kept to the multilateral 
approach and tied the use of force to multilateral legitimacy. American foreign policy 
was compatible with organizational norms and rules and with international obligations. 
Throughout the war Washington consulted European allies, worked toward its policy 
goals through international organizations, and accepted compromises. A major reason for 
this was that Washington could thus shift the burden to others without committing itself 
more than necessary. Even after the war, the majority of Americans envisioned the 
possible deployment of American troops as part of a multilateral force, rather than in a 
unilateral intervention.424 Moreover, Americans opposed even diplomatic unilateral 
actions like lifting the arms embargo. Although American adherence to multilateral 
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norms is recognized as compromising effectiveness and decisiveness, during the Bosnian 
war it left a mark on American perception of multilateralism. 
However, the Yugoslav crisis revealed the limitations of the EU and the UN in 
accepting a larger burden.425 The European principals of those institutions were unable to 
carry the burden of European security alone, and the U.S. was forced to take more 
responsibility than anticipated. Americans who hoped to put the principles of 
multilateralism and burden-sharing into practice saw that the time was not ripe for the 
European allies and international organizations to take all the responsibility for 
Europe.426 The Europeans could not build up a credible military threat to avert or contain 
the war, a threat that becomes necessary when nonviolent approaches fail.427 Thus, 
Europe's leading role, a major concern of the Bush administration, became problematic. 
Eventually the U.S. had to regain its leadership role in NATO.  
The cultural features of casualty aversion and the emphasis on decisive short 
battles and technological advantage also did not change during the Bosnian war. The 
American administrations followed a consistent foreign policy line. With the “lift and 
strike” strategy, Washington tried to repeal the arms embargo imposed by the UN early in 
the conflict, with parallel air strikes to stop the atrocities. The U.S. hoped that this 
strategy could change the military balance and thus stop the fighting. In the meantime, 
Washington hoped the decisive use of airpower would prevent violence and carnage. The 
“lift and strike” strategy was consistent with casualty aversion and the emphasis on 
decisive warfare.428 Since deployment of American ground forces would have led to a 
nebulous outcome in terms of military casualties, the administration favored lifting the 
arms embargo and strengthening the Bosnian and Croat armies as proxy forces. On the 
other hand, political and military elites were aware that intervention with ground troops 
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would not end the war swiftly with a decisive battle, since the war's complexity and 
intensity defied clear victory. Thus, the elites relied on the American and NATO’s 
technological advantages in the form of air strikes. America's reliance on air power and 
proxy forces proves its continued preference for limited liability.429 
According to Dueck, American strategy in the Bosnian war was marked by 
"intense reluctance to back up [the] internationalist agenda by force.”430 The case study 
of the Bosnian war shows that this reluctance is consistent with the security culture of the 
United States. The lack of enthusiasm for involvement in Bosnia was challenged 
throughout the war by the American public. The Clinton administration was forced to 
back its policy with military pressure in late 1994 when NATO's credibility was at stake. 
Thus the Bosnian war became more central for U.S. interests than originally perceived in 
1992. In June 1995, when the war threatened the credibility of the U.S. as a European 
power, the Clinton administration persuaded the allies to accept an endgame strategy. 
The research shows that the majority of Americans supported the use of force 
even when there was no threat to vital American interests.431 The support for air strikes 
against Serb strongholds had almost tripled by April 1994. Most Americans supported 
deploying U.S. troops in a multilateral force after a peace agreement was established. 
Fewer favored the deployment of forces without a peace agreement, which would be a 
deployment to enforce peace rather than to simply monitor it. However, when faced with 
the prospect of American casualties, support for U.S. military deployments declined, 
especially after the Somalia operation. Polls show that Americans wanted the UN to “get 
tougher” and a majority favored deployment of U.S. troops in a multilateral force if 
UNPROFOR was harassed while fighting ethnic cleansing. That said, Americans  
perceived the Bosnian war as comparable to Iraq, rather than Vietnam, and favored the 
use of overwhelming force to stop the humanitarian disaster in Bosnia. Political and 
military elites, even more strongly averse to casualties, supported a policy which relied 
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on technological advantage and minimized American casualties. Even strong advocates 
of American intervention in the Bosnian war like Senator Robert Dole did not envision 
sending ground forces. 
Eventually, the United States came to realize that “European problems in the 
realm of security were American problems.”432 Throughout the Bosnian war, America's 
role in the post-Cold War era was still unclear. The issue density of different international 
events kept America’s attention focused on domestic politics and on relations with Russia 
and trouble spots like the Gulf, Somalia and Haiti. America's retrenchment from 
international responsibility was dangerous for international security, especially where 
there was a need for decisive use of military force.433 The Bosnian war proved that in the 
mid-1990s, the alternative to American leadership was no leadership. The complex and 
unprecedented security challenges of the Bosnian war required leadership. The prospect 
of a highly competitive security environment compelled the U.S. to engage the Bosnian 
war in order to help manage European security.434 The Bosnian war was a catalyst for the 
U.S. to identify its new or rather rediscover its old role in Europe, a matter not of changes 
in security culture, but of practical and consistent reorientation of foreign policy. 
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VI. GERMAN SECURITY CULTURE AND U.S. INTERESTS 
The Bosnian war clearly demonstrates the relevance of culture for international 
politics. The diplomatic and strategic revolution of 1989 challenged both world politics 
and theories of International Relations. Also the increasingly shared security culture 
among transitional actors in the post-Cold War era required a rethinking and reorientation 
of international relations. Euro-Atlantic security cultures adjusted to the post-Cold War 
environment.  
The Bosnian war has been an enduring political shock experience with far-
ranging repercussions on German and U.S. society and political elites alike. The war 
unfolded as a series of formative events understood as individual incidents with singular 
but interrelated impacts (e.g. the continuous shelling of Sarajevo and the attacks on 
Srebrenica). The density and duration of the Bosnian war increased the intensity of its 
effect. At the time, the sheer amount of destruction, ethnically motivated atrocities and 
displacements complicated attempts to understand this intra-state war in a new era that 
started out with hopes to have banished nationalism, ethnic hatred and war.  
The war's profound and challenging issue density and duration increased its 
impact on Germany and the U.S, especially as it stood in stark contrast to the perceived 
new world order. The main transmitters were the media, personal visits to Bosnia, the 
refugees and their lobbying as diaspora communities and the reporting of human rights 
organizations. They transported the war into Western societies and thus mediated 
between the war and domestic security cultures. Formative events spurred international 
condemnation. Equally striking is the effect of the war as a whole. Major intervening 
variables that exposed the public and elites to the war include personal experiences in the 
war zone and exposure to the war through mass media. In addition, the testimony of 
refugees contributed to the transmittance of the war in Germany. The 350,000 refugees 
who sought asylum in Germany presented a large scale refugee crisis. Those refugees 
were human rights violations made visible. The Bosnian war was perceived as a 
humanitarian crisis by American and German publics and elites. 
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This thesis has explored the security cultures of Germany and the United States 
during the Bosnian war, beginning in 1992 and ending with the Dayton Peace Accords of 
1995. Case studies of both Germany and the U.S. have demonstrated that security 
cultures influence the assessment of political situations, restrain policy objectives, and 
condition the range of issues to which political attention is devoted. The German case 
study reveals that the security culture indeed changed profoundly, primarily as concerns 
the use of force. This change affected the evaluation of available policy options and the 
decisions about using German military force outside territorial defense and treaty 
obligations. The case study of the U.S. likewise reveals that security culture predisposes 
foreign policy behavior; however, in contrast to Germany, when faced with the same 
events, a strong security culture does not necessarily change. Yet the U.S. case study 
shows that distinct cultural features, a ranked set of grand strategy preferences, were 
adjusted during the war in favor of a more pronounced leadership role in the complex 
security challenges of the post-Cold War era. 
At the beginning of the conflict, German and American politics were quite 
different; the two nations had almost opposing opinions on the use of force in 
international crisis management. Germany refrained from any use of military force apart 
from territorial defense and NATO obligations. Use of force was simply rejected by the 
elites and by society at large as inappropriate and even taboo. Derived from World War II 
and the political culture of the Federal Republic of Germany during the Cold War, 
Germany's distinct cultural features—the foreign policy of responsibility and the culture 
of restraint—precluded almost all military intervention. This exceptional history led 
German political elites to deemphasize force as an instrument for achieving national 
objectives. The political elite was all the more willing to stress that military force was 
unconstitutional under the nation's Basic Law. As an advocate of soft power, Germany 
acted diplomatically and only in the background throughout the first phase of the conflict, 
not committing its forces to UNPROFOR or calling for military engagement. 
The U.S. at first refrained from even diplomatic interference after an initial probe 
prior to the war. Focused on other international trouble spots, the George H. W. Bush 
administration at first simply did not imagine forceful intervention in European affairs. 
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The distinct cultural features of casualty aversion and technological fetishism did not 
preclude using force. But the Balkan war was seen as a European affair, and the 
administration had begun to downplay the relevance of Europe in its geostrategic 
considerations and to shift the responsibility for European affairs primarily to the 
Europeans. However, due to the much greater willingness to use force in international 
conflicts, the policy change towards intervention did not involve a change of the U.S. 
security culture. Thus, the U.S. repeatedly tried to push the “lift and strike” option 
through and led NATO into successively assuming more responsibility up to the Air 
Campaign. However, both Germany and the U.S. adhered strictly to the norms of 
multilateralism throughout the whole war. German culture demanded that it pursued 
foreign policy only with multilateral legitimacy. The U.S. followed a multilateral course 
because they also preferred multilateralism, but also because it conveniently fitted the 
purpose to shift the burden to the Europeans.  
 The Bosnian war seemed to stand in contradiction to the new world order and 
German reunification; German elites thus perceived a vital interest in settling the conflict. 
In contrast, the war did not initially affect U.S. vital interests. Although German and 
American interests were affected differently, both nations at first abstained from military 
intervention and later became fully involved in peace enforcement, taking pivotal roles in 
the peace settlement and post-conflict peace building phases. This reveals a convergence, 
not only of policies but also of cultures. German security culture became more like the 
American culture in terms of how use of force is perceived, whereas U.S. foreign policy 
shifted towards a more proactive, responsible and leading role in European affairs. 
Germany left crisis management to other European states for almost two years 
after the diplomatic “rapid reaction force” of early recognition. An internal learning 
process led to questioning the Basic Law and the constitutional legitimacy of the use of 
German forces.  Most importantly, Germany began a process of critical self-reflection. 
The traumatic impact of the Bosnian war challenged the core beliefs and values of the 
German public and the political parties. They caused stress because of dissonance within 
the public and the government. The result was several years of agonizing public debate 
on the use of force in international politics. Public support for contributing German 
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troops to UN peacekeeping forces remained mixed, yet there was a slow and steady 
increase of support from about 47 percent in August 1992 to 67 percent in April 1993. 
Support for contributing troops for UN peace enforcement tripled in the same time 
period.   
America was sidelined by its European allies before the outbreak of the war. The 
U.S. accepted European leadership in settling the crisis because the war seemed not to 
affect American vital interests and no core beliefs and values were challenged. The 
distant Balkan culture was seen as violence-prone. The outbreak of violence in distant 
cultures was perceived as unfortunate, unavoidable and not within America's power to 
alleviate. U.S. policymakers believed that crisis management in the Bosnian war could be 
shouldered by the European allies. However, the humanitarian disaster unfolding since 
August 1992 spurred a growing consensus among political elites and the general public 
that “something” should be done. Opinion polls revealed a reluctant but steadily 
increasing support for multilateral military intervention and the use of force. The 
government thus endorsed NATO involvement and tried to persuade European allies to 
accept the “lift and strike” strategy which promised fewer casualties with NATO’s 
technological advantage. The desire for intervention was prompted largely by 
humanitarian and other normative considerations. American interests were at first only 
broadly affected by ensuring that the war did not spread. Yet the justification for U.S. 
intervention shifted slowly from pure humanitarian considerations to concern for U.S. 
national security and interests, specifically as concerns the viability of NATO. 
German political elites, trying to propagate peace but with a strong aversion to 
using military force, were caught in a dilemma. The logic of the Bosnian war exaggerated 
this dilemma because peace could only be enforced with military means. The Bosnian 
war impact was strong and enduring enough to induce great changes in the political 
attitudes of the German political elite, specifically in respect to the use of military force 
outside territorial boundaries and the NATO obligations. The war's long duration allowed 
time for political elites to learn. The distinct cultural features of German foreign policy 
turned out to be increasingly incompatible with the complex security environment of the 
post-Cold War era. Environmental feedback in the form of escalating atrocities 
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publicized by the media led to individual learning, followed by individual actions to 
change the socialized thinking of political parties. Even pacifist groups in Germany were 
forced to consider the use of military means. 
The bombing of Sarajevo and later the Srebrenica massacre finally discredited the 
core beliefs and values of the German political parties and the general population. The 
enduring political shock forced a reorientation of beliefs, norms and values which would 
not have occurred otherwise. The Bosnian war demonstrated the necessity of a totally 
new approach to intervention and Germany's use of force. It was a period of profound 
reorientation, self-reflection and rethinking which challenged core beliefs and resulted in 
a substantial change in the German security culture. The German case study also reveals 
that the sheer quantity of humanitarian tragedy in the Bosnian war changed the security 
culture in Germany. The Balkan tragedy created a moral imperative for the public and 
elites to take action. This action required the utility, quality and quantity of military 
forces in crisis management. 
In 1994, Washington began to see the European problem in Bosnia also as an 
American problem. The Bosnian war revealed the limitations of UN and EU and their 
principals. The inability to shoulder the burden of European security and to intervene 
forcefully in Bosnia decreased their credibility and thus the credibility of NATO and the 
U.S. as well. Formative events (the siege of Sarajevo, the 1995 post-ceasefire violence, 
conquests of UN safe havens) increased public support for forceful UN intervention and 
use of a large scale military force if UNPROFOR was threatened. The November 1994 
electoral defeat in Congress further increased domestic pressure on the Clinton 
administration. Thus, the U.S. government became more and more concerned with a 
conflict which had entered the U.S. sphere of interest. Increasingly, Washington was 
concerned about following multilateral rules and norms which often proved to end in a 
deadlock as strong domestic pressure called for a more forceful and proactive 
engagement.  
Like Germany, Washington was stuck in a dilemma caused by its security culture. 
On the one hand, Washington adhered strictly to multilateral norms and rules. On the 
other hand, it followed a strategy of settling the conflict by decisive military means, using 
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technologically advanced air strikes in the hope of minimizing casualties. This culturally 
inspired new way of war fighting was incompatible with multilateralism, since the 
European allies for the most part disapproved of air strikes against Serb strongholds. 
Washington re-ranked its cultural preferences throughout the Bosnian war. 
Multilateralism dominated during the first years of the war. Though still strong in 1995, 
the preference for multilateralism lost ground relative to other norms. Washington took 
the leadership in Bosnian peace enforcement and more or less forced the European allies 
to accept the enforcement strategy. American diplomatic intervention coincided with 
other events such as the attacks on safe havens, the UN hostage crisis and the Croat 
offensive in August 1995. The hostage crisis convinced the Europeans to deploy the RRF 
and increased pressure to withdraw UNPROFOR. Those events offered a solution to 
Washington’s predicament, and it took a leading role to effectively and responsibly 
resolve the conflict. 
Overall, the Bosnian war had a significant effect on the security culture of 
Germany and a lesser effect on that of the United States. Germany's “weak” and 
comparatively young security culture, when confronted with the Bosnian war after 1989, 
was revealed as vulnerable and Cold War-specific. The complex security challenges after 
the revolution of 1989 necessitated a rethinking and re-orientation of cultural beliefs and 
norms. The Bosnian war in particular catalyzed the change of the German security 
culture. Germany's distinct cultural aversion to the use of force was abandoned and 
shifted in the direction of the American style of using forces in international crisis 
management. Thus, the Bosnian war triggered the convergence of German and American 
security cultures, which is particularly interesting because it contradicts the perceived 
trans-Atlantic rift. 
The “strong” features of the U.S. security culture, entrenched for decades, proved 
their strength and longevity, but were challenged by the uncertainty and instability of the 
post-Cold War era. The strategic and diplomatic revolution of 1989 necessitated a 
redefining of America’s role in world politics which was challenged by the uncertainty 
and instability of the post-Cold War era. America's leadership role in European security 
affairs was put into doubt at the start of the Bosnian war, but retrenchment from 
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international responsibility presented a real danger in the transitional phase of the early 
1990s. Specifically cases that needed decisive use of military force and the will to 
implement it necessitated U.S. leadership. Washington recognized that the Bosnian war 
represented a danger to the credibility of NATO and the U.S. The prospects and risks for 
this highly complex security environment compelled the U.S. to intervene, recognizing 
that its allies were not able to shoulder the burden of European security. That said the lost 
confidence in the European allies and the disappointment during the Bosnian war is 
partly responsible of the trans-Atlantic rift in the early 21st century, as is the US 
unilateralism in Dayton. Overall, the change in U.S. foreign policy was based not upon 
cultural change but upon a change of U.S. foreign policy goals and interests. 
This thesis has found that German perception of military force changed 
considerably within a few years, while the cultural preferences of the United States 
internally shifted as a result of a re-oriented U.S. interest in the international 
environment. Examination of the Bosnian war and its effect on German and American 
security cultures demonstrates the impact of crises and political shocks on international 
actors, the subsequent cultural changes they cause, and the implications this has for 


























This conclusion integrates the findings of the case studies into the existing 
framework of security cultures. Some findings augment recent scholarly work, some shed 
new light on the concept of security cultures, and others raise more questions. The 
sources of security cultures are addressed first, followed by questions about the static vice 
dynamic and homogeneous vice heterogeneous nature of security cultures. Finally the 
aspect of interdependence and multilateralism is addressed. 
This thesis agrees with the scholarly findings that material and ideational factors 
are essential for shaping security cultures, inter alia geography, history and recent 
experiences, political structure and the institutional framework. Specifically, geography 
and history are central elements in the security cultures of Germany and the United 
States. They have a profound effect on these security cultures, cause path dependence, 
shape and transform them. The geographical granted free-ride with weak neighbors and 
two oceans around insulated the U.S. from the destruction of the European wars and 
reduced the perceived imminence of the Soviet threat during the Cold War. Yet, the 
Cuban Missile Crisis demonstrated how geography could change this security perception. 
With threats and anxieties comparatively low, optimism could spread as landmark of the 
strong and self-confident security culture that matured in the United States. In Germany, 
the predator of two world wars and geographically close to the Warsaw Pact and the 
Soviet Union, an almost diametrically opposed security culture developed. The unique 
German historical experience had path dependent effects, caused an extremely cautious, 
responsible and constrained foreign policy that stood in contrast to the more forceful, pro-
active policy the U.S. could afford both due to its history and its status as a superpower.  
Both case studies prove that the internal political structure of a state and its 
institutional entrenchment significantly influence security cultures. The institutional 
framework, in which both countries operated during the Cold War, considerably 
impacted their national security cultures, specifically in regard to the perception of 
human rights. However, the institutional influence was different. As a reluctant, 
restrained power, Germany saw multilateralism as the only legitimate channel to pursue 
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foreign policy goals. Thus, it allowed the use of military force only in a multilateral 
framework, and only for territorial defense and treaty obligations. Organizational 
cultures, especially the integrationist European Community culture, spilled over and 
shaped the German national security culture. The U.S. also perceived multilateralism as 
vital to American interests, focusing mainly on NATO as concerns the European 
outreach. Yet, as the hegemonic power in transatlantic institutions, the U.S. had more 
leverage in the organizational framework. In other words, the U.S. was able to use the 
institutional framework to further its own interests and could afford “to got it alone” 
where preferable. Thus, Washington also pursued foreign policy goals outside the 
institutional framework, specifically in cases that concerned the American continent. The 
American leverage proved to be functional insofar as Washington used NATO’s military 
capability to get involved and finally settle the Bosnian war. 
Overall, the study proves though that the influence of organizational culture is 
limited and strongly dependent on the national actor. The U.S. as a hegemonic power 
with a strong security culture can act outside any organizational culture more than 
Germany and thus, can shape and influence other national actors and organizations to a 
considerable extent. 
Given that historical memory, recent experiences, and multilateral commitments 
shape security cultures, it is evident that those cultures and thus foreign policy are in a 
continuous process of transformation. In the discourse on change of cultures some 
scholars argue that cultures are persistent, static, and resistant to change; others argue that 
cultural change is slow and incremental. The latter emphasize that greater dynamism 
might be triggered by great forces, such as traumatic experiences, crises, and political 
shocks. The slow incremental change of security cultures is caused by learning through a 
continuous process of internalization and socialization in which learning conditions later 
learning. Great changes in direction and velocity caused by traumatic experiences and 
crises discredit core beliefs and values. Such defining events are critical junctures with a 
path-dependent effect. Initial policy choices after those defining events determine future 
policy trajectories and outcomes. 
 115
In fact, this thesis reveals that cultures are both persistent and dynamic. The U.S. 
security culture showed a high degree of stability during the Bosnian war. The strong, 
centuries-old U.S. security culture mainly persisted in the early 1990s. Yet some cultural 
features were challenged after the Cold War and specifically during the Bosnian war. 
German security culture, specifically as concern the use of force, was socially constructed 
only after WW II, a product of the Cold War. It was thus time-dependent and doomed to 
be challenged by the new post-Cold War security environment. In other words, the 
security culture of Germany was not compatible with the new reality after the Cold War 
and thus started to change, a process which was catalyzed by the Bosnian war. The 
distinct cultural aversion of the use of force had been internalized and socialized for 
fewer than five decades and was vulnerable to change. The large-scale humanitarian 
tragedies in the Bosnian war served as a catalyst for considering policy options beyond 
the traditional tenets of German security culture.  
Whereas the domestic impact of the Bosnian war changed the direction and the 
transformation velocity of German security culture, a reassessment and re-ranking of 
cultural preferences took place in the U.S. Multilateralism was discredited and lost 
ground relative to other cultural preferences. As the U.S. grew more impatient with the 
entire vector of UN-EU intervention in Bosnia, it became more proactive and focused on 
power-mediation and on decisive military force, increasingly refusing to adhere to 
multilateral rules and norms.  
Overall, dramatic effects and traumatic experiences challenged both German and 
U.S. cultural features. This thesis also reveals that it is important to consider where to set 
the starting point of security culture, and that each starting point is of course an artificial 
construction that denies the amount of continuity of cultures over time. In the German 
case, the starting point can be pretty clearly set historically (1945), whereas the starting 
point for the examination of the U.S. security culture is blurred.  
This thesis further demonstrates that the German and the U.S. security culture 
indeed converged in the 1990s. Specifically, the German security culture became more 
similar to the U.S. security culture, mainly in regard to the use of military force. This 
convergence seems to contradict the trans-Atlantic rift that is widely discussed today. Yet 
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German security culture seems regressive. Today, public and political elites show 
growing reticence to use force. Thus, the early lessons from World War II and the Cold 
War seem more formative and path-dependent than anticipated. Even though Germany 
contributes large military contingents to operations around the globe, German military 
engagement, starting with the Bosnian war, seems to resemble more the old patterns of 
constrained and restricted use of military force. Life in Germany seems to return to old 
patterns and thinking; to a foreign policy of responsibility and a culture of restraint and 
respective use of force. This phenomenon of German regression implies that either the 
Bosnian war was not a great enough contextual force to cause a permanent change of the 
German security culture, or, following Eckstein, the war had a sector-specific impact on 
German security culture, with change distributed unevenly among the different cultural 
components. A further great contextual force of German regression was the third Iraq war 
starting in March 2003. The extreme negative public opinion towards the U.S. led 
operation inhibited further societal support for German military engagements. It caused a 
resemblance to old patterns of restricted use of force. 
As concerns future scholarly work on security cultures, four conclusions might be 
drawn. First, given that security culture is a ranked set of preferences and that the impact 
of exogenous factors is distributed unevenly among cultural components, the nature and 
structure of national security cultures are of enormous importance for further scholarly 
analysis. Thus, when using a comparative case study method to examine cultural change, 
as in this thesis, it seems wise to select most similar cases, i.e. with similar security 
cultures and comparable cultural preferences. In other words, the independent variable 
does not need to be one single historical event as long as the cultures of the cases are 
similar and comparable. This method might give additional insights into the nature and 
consistency of security cultures and how cultures change and transform irrespective of 
time and space. If similarities can be demonstrated, the concept of security culture 
consequently becomes even more important to examine and explain international foreign 
policy behavior. 
Second, even within a ranked cultural set or menu, heterogeneity and 
homogeneity exist side by side. There are dominant cultural preferences and competing 
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ones. Therefore, it is not only of importance what domestic group actually shapes the 
security culture of a country but also which cultural preference is more compatible with 
the outside world. This finding contributes to the scholarly discourse on homogeneity and 
heterogeneity. It implies that individuals have different orientations and learn different 
things from experience. Societies contain multiple strategic cultures because they 
encompass various subcultures. It is necessary to examine which group actually most 
shapes the security culture of a country, but this is in part dependent on which cultural 
preference is compatible with the outside world.  
Interdependence, globalization and integration are not yet much a part of the 
academic discourse on security cultures. Do nation-states share a common security 
culture because of parallel identity formation processes? Do liberal democracies perceive 
themselves as an in-group because of that? Many questions concerning trans-nationalism 
and its effects on the universality and boundaries of security cultures remain unanswered.  
This thesis reveals that interdependence and multilateralism have an enormous 
effect on security cultures. In Germany and the U.S., the public and political elites' 
support for humanitarian intervention increased strongly when the UN got threatened or 
harassed in operations. The U.S. public especially supported use of overwhelming force 
after the hostage crisis and when the UN humanitarian relief operations were harassed. 
The German political elites and general public strongly supported the involvement of the 
military to safeguard the UN blue helmet mission. Even though the whole UN mission 
during the Bosnian war was seen as a debacle, there was a strong identification with the 
UN operation, and UN humanitarian aid was perceived as legitimate and morally right. 
All in all, three hypotheses can be derived from the findings of this thesis: 
H 1: Strong national security cultures are less vulnerable to influences from 
multilateral settings. On the contrary, they play a vital formative role in institutions. 
States with strong security cultures can strongly impact other security cultures in these 
multilateral settings and thus guide institutional behavior. 
H 2: In using comparative case studies to examine cultural change, one may select 
cases with a similar security culture and thus comparable cultural preferences, rather than 
cases focusing on the same historical event. 
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H 3: It is not only important which domestic group shapes the security culture of a 
country, but also which cultural preferences are more compatible with the outside world 
in times of trial. 
This thesis is not a Promethean achievement, nor does this author wish to serve a 
Promethean sentence. The thesis contributes to recent scholarly work, but it also raises 
new questions. It is evident that security cultures influence the assessment of political 
situations, restrain policy objectives, and condition the range of issues to which political 
attention is devoted. While security cultures have become a focus of recent scholarly 
research, proving that they are important tools for understanding foreign policy, the 
concept of security cultures deserves more research. The thesis enhances our 
understanding of German and U.S. foreign policy and sheds light on the concept of 
security cultures by using two case studies to compare security cultures and their 
persistence and change in time of war. 
Friedrich Nietzsche once claimed that war is the hibernation of culture. This 
thesis proves that culture is neither in a torpid nor resting state in times of war. It is rather 
challenged and confronted with new unique experiences, which stimulate cultural change. 
This in turn influences and challenges political behavior during those times. Not 
hibernation, but acceleration of cultural change is what we observed here. 
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